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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PHYTOSANITARY BARRIERS IN THE AUSTRALIAN 
APPLE MARKET 
by 
M. V. Cortes Rodrfguez 
The most common non tariff barriers that affect New Zealand (NZ) trade in apples are 
phytosanitary ones. This research focused on the economic analysis of this type of barrier. It 
especially refers to the potential apple trade between Australia (importer) and NZ (exporter) 
which is currently prohibited due to the existence of Fire Blight disease in NZ. 
A partial equilibrium model of eight simultaneous equations was developed. It was 
simulated under four alternative policies as a means of determining the effects of a reduction 
in the Fire Blight phytosanitary barrier. The policies involved changes in the exogenous variables: 
the non tariff barrier, the cost of the Fire Blight control in NZ and the cost of Fire Blight in 
Australia. Policy one involved a reduction in the ban without cost requirements for either 
country. Policy two involved a reduction in the ban and an imposition of requirements for Fire 
Blight control in NZ in order to minimize the risk of the disease entering Australia. Policy three 
involved a reduction in the import ban and disease control costs in Australia. Policy four involved 
a reduction of the import ban and shared disease control costs in both countries. The effects of 
a reduction in the import ban was evaluated by considering the changes in economic welfare with 
respect to the base line (current situation) in both countries. 
The model predicted that the change in the consumer surplus in NZ was negative in all 
cases, but this was compensated by positive changes in the NZ producer surplus which was 
almost four times higher. Therefore, in NZ, the changes in total economic welfare were positive 
for all policy changes. 
For the Australian market, the model predicted ambiguous welfare effects. The Australian 
producer surplus was negative but the total consumer surplus was positive and its value varied 
depending on the particular policy. A rent to the non tariff barrier was established once NZ 
apple imports were permitted. The rent represented th~ difference between the import price and 
the Australian price of apples. The existence of this rent is a part of the distorting effect of this 
barrier in the Australian market. This research identified that with a reduction of ten percent 
of the tariff equivalent of the non tariff barrier, the best alternative policy for both countries was 
the reduction in the non tariff barrier with shared costs of Fire Blight disease control (policy 
four). 
Key words: apples, international trade, non tariff barriers, Fire Blight, phytosanitary 
barriers, simultaneous equations, partial equilibrium model, alternative 
policies, welfare analysis. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract •..•••.••••••.•.•.•.....•.•••••...•.....................•.•...•..............................•.••.•.••......•.............••.....• 
vTable of Contents .•.••••••••.•••••••..•.•.•.•..•.•..............••••.....••.....•.••..••..••...•.....•....•.•••••.•....•••••••....• 
List of Tables ••••••••••••.••••.••••••••..••••.•••••••••••.•.•..•••••.••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••...••.••••••••.•.•••••••••••..•••••• 
List of Figures ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•.•...•.•.••••••.•••••••.••••.••..••••••.•••••••••••••..•••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Abbreviations .••••••••••••••••••••••.••...•..•..•••.•••.....••.•..•..•..............••.•••••.••....••.........•.•.......•..•.•••••.... 
"/ ~//CHAPrER 1 ::INTR.ODUCTION ••..•.•.•...•..•.•.••...••••.......•••..••••.••.•.••.••.•••••••••••...••••••••.••.••.•••• 
1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... . 
1.2. Research Objectives •••.••..••••••••••..•.......••••...•.•••...•.•••..•.••••....•.••••••••.••...•.•.•••••••.••••••..••••••• 
1.3. Outline of this Study .••.•••.•.•.•.•••.•..••.•......•..•.••••.•...•.....•••••.•••.••••.•.••.•••••••••...••••••...••..•...• 
CHAPrER Z UTERA. TURE REVIEW •...•...............••.•........•.•..•.•..•...•....................•....•••• 
2.1. PROTECTIONISM .••••••••••••.•.......•....••..•..••....•••••.•...•..•••••..••••••••••••...•.•••••••••..•..••••••••..•.. 
2.2. NONT ARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE •••.••.•••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••.••.••••••••••••...••.•••••••••• 
2.2.1. Classiftcation of non tariff barriers ............................................................ . 
2.2.2. Health and sanitary regulation ................................................................... . 
2.3. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFF AND TRADE .............................. .. 
2.4. TRADE MODEL •••••••••.••••••••••••••••••.•.•••••..••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••.••.•••••••••.•.•••.••••••••.•.•.•••••.• 
CHAPrER 3 N1B IN NEW ZEALAND'S APPLE IMPORT MARKETS: 
ii 
iii 
vi 
vii 
viii 
1 
1 
2 
2 
4 
4 
5 
6 
7 
7 
9 
BACKGROUND.................................................................................................................... 11 
3.1. WORLD APPLE TRADE............................................................................................. 11 
3.2. NZ'S APPLE INDUSTRY .........•..•.•.•.••...•••.........•••......••••••••••••••.•.•......•....••.••••••...••.•... 11 
3.2.1. Production...................................................................................................... 12 
3.2.2. New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board....................................... 13 
3.2.3. Barriers for NZ fresh apples ...................... ~................................................. 14 
3.3. CURRENT NZ APPLE MARKETS........................................................................... 15 
3.3.1. European Community ................................................................................... 16 
3.3.1.1. EC Policy .....••....••.•.....................•.......•.•••...•.•.•••..................•••.••....• 17 
3.3.1.2. Apple Trade between NZ and EC............................................... 17 
3.3.2. United Sta.tes of America.............................................................................. 19 
3.3.2.1. Apples sector in US........................................................................ 20 
3.3.2.2. Apple Trade between US and NZ......................... ....................... 20 
3.4. NZ POTENTIAL MARKETS...................................................................................... 21 
3.4.1. Japan............................................................................................................... 21 
3.4.1.1. Apple industry in Japan................................................................ 21 
3.4.1.2. NZ apples Access Proposal to Japan ....................................... ... 
3.4.2. Australia ........................................................................................................ . 
3.4.2.1. Australian apple industry ............................................................ . 
3.4.2.2. NZ·Australia Bilateral Agreements ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
3.5. GENERAL ANALYSIS OF NON TARIFF BARRIERS FOR NZ 
SELECTED MARKETS .............................. _ ................................. __ .................. . 
CBAPTEll 4 CASE STUDY: FIRE BLIGHT AFFECTING NZ APPLE EXPORTS 
22 
23 
23 
24 
25 
iv 
TO AUS'fRA.UA.. ............................. __ •••••••••••••••••••••••••• _..................................................... 27 
4.1. FIRE BUGHT DISEASE ••• __ ..................................................................................... 27 
4.1.1. Transnlission and Detection......................................................................... 28 
4.1.2. Control Measures........................................................................................... 29 
4.1.4. Econonlic losses.............................................................................................. 30 
4.2. ACCESS PROPOSALS: HISTORICAL REVIEW................................................... 30 
4.3. BIOECONOMIC RISK ASSESSMENT .................................................................... 34 
4.3.1. The Biologica.l Impact................................................................................... 34 
4.3.2. The econonlical impact................................................................................. 35 
4.4. POUTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE IMPORT BAN.................................. 37 
4.4.1. International Obligations.............................................................................. 38 
4.4.2. Australia View Point..................................................................................... 38 
4.4.3. NZ View point................................................................................................ 39 
4.4.4. General Considerations................................................................................. 39 
CHA.P'I'ER 5 ANALYTICAL MODEL............................................................................. 41 
5.1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: PARTIAL EQUILmRIUM MODEL............... 41 
5.2. MODEL FOR NZ APPLE TRADE............................................................................ 42 
5.2.1. Model for NZ apple trade ........................................................................... . 
5.2.2. Assumptions .................................................................................................. . 
5.3. MODEL EQUA nONS ................................................................................................ . 
5.4. DATA SPECIFIC A nON ............................................................................................ . 
5.4.1. Parameters ..................................................................................................... . 
5.4.2. Model Solution .............................................................................................. . 
5.5. ECONOMICAL EV ALUA TION OF A REDUCTION IN IMPORT 
PROTECTION ..................................................................................................................... . 
S.S.I. Current situation ..••.•..•••...•.•.........•.••••....•••...•••.••............•.....••.•.•...•..••.••••.•.•.• 
5.5.2. Alternative polices ••..•.•••••••.•••..••.••••.•••.•••••...•••...•.•.......•.......••••••••..•....•••••.•••.. 
5.5.3. Cost Benefit Analysis .................................................................................... . 
42 
44 
44 
49 
49 
51 
52 
52 
53 
54 
5.6. RESUL TS ...................................................................................................................... . 
5.6.1. Alternative policy I ...................................................................................... . 
5.6.2. Alternative policy 2 ...................................................................................... . 
5.6.3. Alternati ve policy 3 ...................................................................................... . 
5.6.4. Alternative policy 4 ....................................................................................... . 
5.6.5'. General Analysis ........................................................................................... . 
CRAP'rER ., DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSl"ONS ....................................................... . 
6.1. DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ ~ ....................... . 
6.2. CONCLUSIONS ...............................................................•............................................ 
6.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ........................................ . 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... . 
References .............................................................................................................................. . 
Deftnitlons .............................................................................................................................. . 
List of Appendices ................................................................................................................ . 
S6 
S6 
S9 
61 
63 
6S 
68 
68 
69 
73 
74 
7S 
88 
89 
v 
vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 
3.1. Barriers to Access for New Zealand fresh apples 1988........................................... 14 
4.1. Some field factors used in Fire Blight risk assessment............................................ 28 
4.2. Timescale of the Access Proposal of NZ's apples to Australia market.................. 31 
5.1. Summary of the Parameters (price elasticities) used in the equations model...... SO 
5.2. Current situation in the Australian and NZ apples markets.................................. 53 
5.4. Effects of the simulation policy one............................................................................ 57 
S.S. Effects of the simulation policy two............................................................................ 60 
5.6. Etl'ects of the simulation policy three............................................................................ 62 
5.7. Effects of the simulation policy four ............................................................................ 64 
vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 
3.1. Value of NZ apples fresh fruit ex-port $()()()............................................................... 12 
3.2. Monthly export volume NZ fresh apple 1987·91....................................................... 13 
3.3. Destination of NZ exports of fresh pip fruit................................................... ............. 16 
3.4. Apple's production in selected markets...................................................................... 17 
S.l .. Model for NZ apple trade............................................................................................. 43 
S.l. EtTect of Policy 1 on the endogenous variables.......................................................... 56 
5.3. Australian excess demand for NZ-type apples........................................................... 58 
5.4. Effect of the alternative policies on the endogenous variables................................. 59 
5.5. Rent to the non tarUT barrier vs consumer surplus in Australia............................ 63 
5.6. Evaluation of welfare economic of the alternative policies....................................... 66 
5.7. Total welfare effect on Australia and New Zealand.................................................. 67 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ABARE = Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resources Economics 
AFBR = American Farm Bureau Federation 
ANZCERTA = Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
AQIS = Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 
ARS = Agricultural Research Service (USDA) 
DQA = Bilateral Quarantine agreement Australia NZ 
DRR 
CAP 
CS 
DSIR 
DPIE 
EC 
ED 
EDF 
EPA 
ES 
FAO 
FCDA 
FDA 
FRC 
GATT 
HEWUS 
HPC 
IAI 
IPPC 
MAF 
MAFF 
MAFQUAL 
MAFTECH 
MERT 
MPL 
MRLs 
= Bureau of Rural Resources Australia 
= Common Agricultural Policy 
= consumer surplus 
= NZ Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
= Australian Department of Primary Industry Energy 
= European Community 
= excess demand 
= Environmental Defense Fund 
= Environmental Protection Agency 
= excess supply 
= Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
= Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. 
= Food and Drug Administration US 
= Fruit Research Committee NZ 
= General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
= Department of Health, Education and Welfare, US 
= Horticultural Policy Council 
= International Apple Institute 
= International Plant Protection Convention 
= Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries NZ 
= Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries of Japan 
= Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Quality Management 
= Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
= Ministry of External Relations and Trade 
= maximum pest limit 
= maximum residual levels 
viU 
MTN 
NACA 
NAS 
NASS 
NB 
NEPA 
NFU 
NRDC 
NTBs 
NZ 
NZAPMB 
OECD 
OFCSA 
PS 
QRA 
rNTB 
RPAR 
SITC 
SPS 
TBTs 
UNCTAD 
US 
USDA 
USDI 
VRA 
WAC 
WHO 
= multilateral trade negotiations 
= National Agricultural Chemical Association 
= National Academy of Sciences 
= National Agriculture Security Service NZ Quarantine Service 
= net benefit 
= National Environment Protection Act (1969) 
= National Farmers Union 
= Natural Resources Defense Council 
= non tariff barriers 
= New Zealand 
= NZ apple and pear marketing Board 
= Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
= Orchardists and fruit cool store Association Australia 
= producer surplus 
= quantitative risk assessment 
= rent to the non tariff barrier 
= Rebuttable presumption against registration 
= The Standard international trade classification 
= sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
= technical barriers to trade 
= United Nations conference on trade and development 
= United States 
= Department of Agriculture US 
= Department of the interior US 
= Voluntary restraint agreements 
= Washington apple Commission 
= World Health Organization 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
CIIAPfER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
After World War II, there was a general movement towards a reduction in barriers to 
International trade throughout the world. This IIberalised trade movement coincided with a 
period of twenty years of world economic stability and rapid technological change. 
Trade barriers were particularly reduced for manufactured products. However, tarltT 
and non tariff barriers to trade in agricultural and food products were not part of this trend. 
Global economic stability was shaken from 1970 onwards, first by the commodity price 
of 1972·74 and then by the two major oil-shocks of 1973 and 1979. One response to the ensuing 
Instability was an Increase In trade protectionism, particularly (but not exclusively) in agricultural 
products Including apples. 
This period of increased protectionism has been notable for its increase in the use of non 
taritT barriers to trade. These barriers to trade take the form of specific measures on apples to 
limit access from Imports and to stimulate domestic production reducing excess demand in 
markets. 
Apples are a major horticultural export crop in New Zealand (NZ), with high volume 
export undergoing rapid expansion. The majority of apple orchards are intensively planted with 
high yielding varieties. The NZ apple trade has an advantage with its out-of-season production 
vis a vis Northern Hemisphere countries. 
This research goes some way towards documenting the general context of non tarltT 
barriers that affect NZ apples export, specifically in the markets of the United States (US), 
European Community (EC), Japan and Australia. One of the key reasons for choosing these 
markets is that they are the most important real and potential markets. However, only one 
market was selected for economic analysis because of the diversity of non tariff barriers 
discovered. 
2 
Australia is a potential market for NZ's apples, but at the moment no apple trade exists. 
The reason for banning NZ exportation is on phytosanitary grounds: the "Fire Blight" problem. 
Thlsrepresents an interesting case, when considering the trade relationship between both 
countries and existing trade agreements such as ANZCERTA. It also presents a suitable 
environment for the analysis of the eft'ects of the NTBs, because both countries are at a similar 
stage of economic development, with similar market characteristics. Also, both have a common 
language, similar culture and similar British-type institutions. 
In the current GATT round, the US and the Cairns group are focusing on the removal 
of non tarift' barriers around the world. This case of a phytosanitary barrier on NZ apple 
exportation to Australia because of Fire Blight was selected by the AQIS, BRR and ABARE to 
trial the methods for undertaking Bio-economic risk assessments as part of decision making on 
quarantine matters during 1990/91. 
There are only a few previous studies of non tarift' barriers in a specific commodity. This 
Issue will be analyzed using the Partial Equilibrium model, in which two participating countries 
face alternative policies. 
1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The general objective of this research is to examine the non tarift' barriers aft'ecting import access 
for NZ apples to Australia, European Community, Jap\Ul and the United States. The analysis 
of the economic effects was concentrated on trade protection given by the quarantine barrier for 
Fire Blight on NZ apples into Australia. The specific objective is the overall evaluation of the 
simulation of reduction in the phytosanitary barrier (NTB) and its economic welfare eft'ects in 
NZ and Australia. 
1.3. OUTLINE OF THIS STUDY 
In Chapter 2 the theoretical background of non tariff barriers is reviewed. The literature review 
3 
discusses the role of the state and non tariff barriers to trade and its classification. 
Chapter 3 focuses on general aspects of the NZ apple industry and its most relevant 
characteristics of production and trade considering real and potential imports of NZ apples (four 
selected markets: Australia, EC, Japan and US). Some perspectives on the position of the 
dltTerent apple markets with respect to non taritT barriers are described. 
Chapter 4 concentrates on the Australian phytosanitary import barrier for Fire Blight 
disease. The bioeconomic risk embodied in the potential trade of NZ apples to Australia has been 
addressed in previous research and these results are discussed in the same section. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the development of an economic model to evaluate the etTect of 
reducing phytosanitary barriers. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, a summary is presented and some conclusions and suggestions made 
in order to aid future research. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
4 
The purpose of this chapter, is to review the different theories of non tariff barriers. The first 
part Is concerned with the role of the state and protectionism. The second section discusses non 
tarltT barriers to trade. In the third section the multilateral agreements are reviewed in the 
context of non tariff barriers on agricultural trade. The last section of this chapter comprises a 
literature review of the trade models. 
2.1. PROTECTIONISM 
The first priority, for whatever nation, is the welfare of Its citizens. One role of government is 
to intenene to assure a strategic position or to provide a credible commitment for strategic 
poUdes of domestic firms confronting foreign rivals (Hillman, 1989; Hillman, 1991). 
Free trade has been proposed within the framework of the traditional trade theory which 
argues that it is the fir$t best poUcy. It maximizes a country's national Income and permits the 
achievement of maxiIl1al aggregate consumption possibilities, subject to quaUfications deriving 
from the Identlficatio~ of various 'distortions' which underlie market failures (Hillman 1989). 
For Vanberg (1990), the theory of free trade enhances the welfare of a nation even if it is 
practised unilaterally. Free trade has the advantage of allowing individual countries to make the 
best use of their avaUable resources (Vanberg,1990). Regarding free trade, neoclassical theorems 
present propositions about efficiency and aggregate welfare, and argue that protection produces 
deadweight costs (Hillman, 1991). 
Buchanan (1988) notes that while Government plays an essential role in facilitating free 
trade, its coercive power can also be employed to inhibit free trade through protectionist 
measures. 
Protectionist measures are usually intended to meet two broad objectives: firstly provide 
visible and immediate relief to industries, and notably to their workforce and secondly, to allow 
5 
on-going adjustment to changing circumstances. In trade policy debates it is argued that 
domestic industries should receive temporary protection from import competition in order to 
introduce new technologies, thereby effectively competing with their foreign rivals (Mat suyama, 
1990). Rowlex (1988) suggests that: governments use protectionist policies to shield domestic 
industry from foreign competition, and their justification of protection is based on economic and 
non economic grounds. 
II NON TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE 
Barriers that aiTeet trade can be either tariffs or non tariiT barriers (NTBs). Economists often 
refer to NTBs as administered protection, because they typically do not imply legislative 
enactment of each act of protection. In this situation the administrators (bureaucrats) have at 
least some choice regarding the extent and/or the height of the barrier. These restrictions are 
customarily applied through institutions and processes set up to regulate imports, including the 
exercise of political power by the executive branch in making trade restraining arrangements 
with other countries (Bhagwati, 1989). 
Non tariff trade restrictions, usually involve some legitimate exercise of a state's authority 
to regulate its domestic commerce for the health, safety and well-being of its citizens. These 
regulations may include written or unwritten potential barriers to trade (BUlman, 1989; Hillman, 
1991). In general terms, NTBs help to regulate and protect domestic production. A non tarltT 
measure is defined as any device or practice other than a tariff, which directly impedes the entry 
of imports into a country and/or which discriminates against imports whilst not applying with 
equal force on all domestic production. Therefore, NTBs distort international trade (Baldwin, 
1989). 
If the regulations apply with equal force to domestic as well as to imported products, 
those regulations cannot be considered as non tariff measw'es (Deardorff, 1985). NTBs will 
include all those restrictions other than traditional customs duties which distort international 
trade, such as impediments at national borders. All types of domestic laws and regulations that 
6 
discriminate against imports aimed at stimulating domestic production (Hillman, 1991). 
There is a growing consensus in the trade policy community that NTBs to trade may now 
be more important than tariffs in terms of the extent to which they distort and restrict 
international trade (Deardorff, 1985). The attempts by international negotiators to control NTBs 
to date have been risky, unsystematic, and ultimately ineffectual (Hillman, 1991). 
Some NTBs by their nature tend to discriminate among trading partners, while others 
are not necessarily discriminatory but can be used to discriminate (pomfret, 1988). Oxley (1990), 
suggests that NTBs should be eliminated over a ten-year period. He proposed that aU barriers 
to agricultural trade should be transformed into tariffs, then those tariffs should be progressively 
reduced to very low levels. 
ut. Classification of non tariff barriers 
A wide range of NTBs affects horticultural trade. They include quotas and related restrictions, 
voluntary export constraints, variable import levies, minimum price systems, and countervailing 
taxes and duties, as well as technical specifications, especially health restrictions, sanitary 
regulations, quality requirements and strict labelling and packaging specifications (Appendix 1). 
There are other non tariff measures that are used to restrict trade in agricultural products such 
as restrictions of imports of some products during certain periods of the year, generally when 
domestic product is to begin to be marketed. 
These barriers Imposed by an importing country are sometimes used to reduce imports. 
Licences to import horticultural products increases the transaction costs of the import trade 
(Hillman, 1991; Islam, 1990). For Bhagwati (1989), two classes of NTBs can be distinguished: 
those that bypass GATT's rule of law and those that capture and pervert it. 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCT AD) and other writers 
nave classified non tariff measures into three types. Type I "al e those where the specific intent 
is to restrict imports and to stimulate exports in a way will inevitllbly cause trade distortion". Type 
n "are those measures the primary intent of which is to deal with economic, socilll and poUtical 
7 
problems but which are occasionally used to restrict imports or stimulate exports". Type m "are 
measures or policies thal are not intended as instruments of trade protection but nevertheless, 
inadvertently cause trade distortion" (Hillman, 1991:40). 
2.Z.1. Healtb md sanitary regulation 
Trade in agricultural products is subject to health and phytosanitary controls on imports as well 
as on domestic products. Phytosanitary regulations constitute a class of NTBs (Hillman, 1991). 
One problem with the enforcement of phytosanitary and sanitary regulations is the 
variation In standards among different countries. Policy Implications of debates at the 
International level may be translated into national regulatory contexts. International 
harmonization will require changes in regulations domestically and for import products 
(Boardman, 1986; Rhodes, 1990). 
2.3. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFF AND TRADE 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was part of the scheme to restructure 
international relations after the Second World War. Its main objective is to eliminate the adverse 
effects of unfair polices, barriers and protectionist measures on trade. The purpose of GATT was 
to persuade signatories to commit themselves to liberal trading principles and to lock into 
arrangements that progressively pegged their economies to international market prices. 
NZ has been a member of the GATT Agreement on technical barriers to trade since 1980. 
NZ is a member of the Cairns Group along with 14 other countries such as Australia, Canada, 
and other Latin American, European and Asian countries. The Cairns Group has sought the 
reduction of barriers, subsidies and other measures affecting the international trade of 
COl nmodities. 
The GATT negotiations on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) are important for 
horticultural trade because these exports are regulated by the sanitary standards prescribed by 
8 
importing countries. A movement towards harmonization of quarantine procedures 
Internationally, is being pursued in those negotiations and also the reduction of the adverse effect 
that unfair health and safety standards and technical regulations may have on agricultural trade. 
The agreement on technical barriers to trade, more commonly known as the "Standards Code" , 
entered Into force on January 1980. Article XX of the GAIT provides for the adoption and 
enforcement of phytosanltary and sanitary restrictions if they are necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life of healthl. 
The fundamental principle of GATT Is that open markets are most emclent. The 
operating premise is that measures which impeded trade should have the least distorting effect 
on markets and therefore it should be gradually reduced (Oxley, 1990). In past GAIT rounds 
It was proposed that export subsides will be prohibited and that import quotas, variable levies, 
"voluntary" export restraint agreements, and other NTBs would be replaced by tariffs that would 
be reduced In concert with the reductions in domestic support. This concept called 
"Tarimcation", would make protection more transparent and more readily negotiable and make 
the domestic markets more responsive to world market conditions (Sanderson, 1990:14). 
SPS measures are a major concern in the current GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Technical barriers to trade where they are unjustified as legitimate protection against pest and 
diseases, are under scrutiny in these negotiations. Any success in the Uruguay Round in bringing 
Into Hne the use of quotas, tariffs, and other barriers to trade could be negated by countries using 
technical barriers to trade in an unjustified manner (AQIS, 1990; Landos, 1990). At the time of 
writing no final GAIT agreement on these issues had been announced. 
1 "ensure transparency and the existence of an effective 
notification process for national regulation process which 
ensures an opportunity for the bilateral resolution of disputes; 
to improve the effectiveness of multilateral dispute settlement 
process; to provide necessary input of scientific expertise and 
judgment, relaying on relevant international organizations". 
(Islam, 1990:23) 
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2.4. TRADE MODELS 
In international trade the estimation of trade models is an important aid to understanding the 
behaviour of the market. According to Labys (1973), flow models apply to a system of export and 
Import equations that, together with a trade flow matrix, explain the effects of changes in 
economic conditions upon trade between countries. There are two recognized general models of 
trade that" have dominated the empirical literature, namely the imperfect substitutes model and 
the perfect substitute model" (Jones, 1985:1044). The "imperfect substitutes model" is one that 
focuses on the analysis of trade of differentiated goodsz• The perfect substitutes model, on the 
. other hand, concentrates on the trade of close or perfect substitute~. 
According to Jones (1985), the main characteristics of the imperfect substitutes model are: 
the consumer is postulated to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint and the resulting 
demand function for imports and exports thus represent the quantity demanded as a function 
of the level of (money) income in the importing region, the price of the imported good and the 
price of domestic substitutes. 
Recent developments in partial equilibrium trade models such as presented by Laird S 
" Yeats (1992) have simulated the likely magnitude of effects of NTBs on international trade. 
Other studies have used partial equilibrium models in ex post analyses of multilateral trade 
negotiations (MTNs) to quantify the gains or losses accruing to participating countries. 
Trade elasticities provide a means of analysing the effect of government policies and 
represent an important contribution to the process of designing and evaluating policy options 
(Carter, 1988). Some international trade theories of demand for tradable goods, assumed that 
2 The key assumption in this "imperfect substitutes model" 
is that neither imports nor exports are perfect substitutes for 
domestic goods (Jones, 1985). 
3 with respect to the "perfect substitutes model" there is 
the argument that if domestic and foreign goods were perfect 
substitutes, then: either the domestic or foreign good swallowing 
up the whole market when each is produced under constant (or 
decreasing)cost and each country as an exporter or importer of 
trade but not both. (Jones, 1985:1045) 
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merchandise of a given kind supplied by sellers in one country is a perfect substitute for 
merchandise of the same kind supplied by any other country4. An alternative approach uses 
differences among suppliers rather than in product characteristics. Product differentiation is an 
Important factor In international trade. 
According to Armington (1969), there are three important characteristics of International 
Trade flows: the kind of merchandise involved, the country or region of the seller, and the 
country or region of the buyer. In Armington's" Theory of demand for products distinguished 
by place of production", the fundamental assumption is that: "products of different countries 
competing in the same market are imperfect substitutes"S (Armington, 1969:159). 
Armington's model (1969) allows for different prices In each market based on market 
loyalty and other characteristics by country of origin. 
4 Which implies constant price ratios and infinite 
elasticities of substitution between these supplies. 
5 It assumes: (i) constant elasticities of substitution 
between products competing in any market (they do not depend on 
market share). (ii) The elasticity of substitution between any 
two products competing in a market is the same as that between 
any other pair of products competing in the same market. 
(Armington, 1969) 
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CHAPTER 3 
NTBS IN NEW ZEALAND'S APPLE IMPORT MARKETS: BACKGROUND 
The objective of this chapter is to review the most important characteristics of New Zealand's 
apple production and the non tariff barriers affecting its apple trade. Additionally, it gives some 
historical perspective on the position of the NZ apple exports with respect to the most important 
current markets (European Community and United States) and potential markets (Japan and 
Australia). 
3.1. WORLD APPLE TRADE 
The world market for apples has two sets of seasonal producers in the Northern and South 
Hemisphere. Production In the main Northern Hemisphere markets is important as improved 
storage technology may restrict off-season demand for impor~Demand for apples has a seasonal 
dimension and it faces competition from other close substitutes such as other fresh fruits. 
Increased Imports from the South Hemisphere countries are due to the rising consumer demand 
for off-season fruit and changing consumer preferences for new varieties and high quality apples 
(OECD, 1991). 
In 1987, the most important producer countries in the world apple trade were France 
(24%), Italy (11 %) and NZ (10%), followed by the Uni~ed States (US) and Chile (Appendix 2). 
The main importer countries were EC off-season, specially West Germany, Netherlands and the 
US (Satyanarayana, 1989). 
3.2. NZ APPLE INDUSTRY 
Apple growing began in NZ in the 1840's. Since 1980's apples planting has been stimulated. In 
1986 there were 7818.ha planted (Nicholson, 1990). 
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3.2.1. ProdudiOD 
Apple production In NZ Is located principally In Hawkes Bay, Nelson, Otago, Canterbury and 
Marlborough. Canterbury Is an area identified as having considerable potential for apple 
production (Nicholson, 1990). NZ's per capita consumption is one of the highest in the world. 
The domestic fresh apple market is expected to remain stable at around 40 thousand tonnes per 
year In the medium term. The major share of apple production is derived from orchards over 
30 hectares which are managed by well trained producers (OECD, 1991). 
The most important apple cultivars are: Granny Smith, Red Delicious, Braeburn, Royal 
Gala, Cox's Orange, Gala and Fuji. In 1986, Granny Smith and Red Delicious made up 60 per 
cent of NZ 's apple crop. The new varieties such as Braeburn, Royal Gala and Fuji have been weD 
received by consumers, they comprise around 10 per cent of NZ production. The ability to supply 
these varieties should give to NZ a comparative advantage over competitors (MAF, 1987; 
Monlgatti,1991). 
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Figure 3.1. Value of New Zealand Apples Fresh Fruit Export 
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I 
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In the last ftve years the NZ value export of fresh apples rose from $ 283 million to $480 
million NZ dollars in 1991. Figure 3.1. shows us the value of NZ apple exports (Appendix 3). 
About 55 per cent of NZ's apple crop is exported fresh (MAF, 1987). 
Figure 3.2. shows that the months of high volume apples exports from NZ are between 
March and June with around 98 per cent of the total fresh fruit export (Appendix 4.1.). 
New Zealand export volume 
fresh apple average (1987-1991) 
Tonnes(Thousands) 
70 63.3 
35 ....... 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sap Oct Nov Dec 
Months 
Source: NZ Department of Statistics 
Figure 3.2. Monthly export volume NZ fresh apples 
NZ quarantine services are administered by the National Agriculture Security Service 
(NASS). It comprises MAF Policy which is responsible for standards, specifications and audits 
and MAF Quality which is responsible for service delivery and operational procedures. NASS 
protects the NZ environment from pests and diseases that impede the country's ability or 
competitiveness to export. 
3.2.2. New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board 
In NZ the apple industry is controlled by a statutory producer/marketing board. The New 
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Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board (NZAPMB) was established to set up a central 
organisation to receive and market all apples and pears grown in NZ. The NZAPMB has the 
power to intervene in the apple trade and it represents a long-standing feature of the NZ 
commercial environment. This organisation has certain marketing rights in the domestic market 
and It has the sole right to import apples and pears. The NZAPMB has monopoly control over 
fresh apple exports except to Australia since July 1990 (MERT, 1990; Nicholson, 1990). 
The Board operates with the NZ image as a generic description. The NZAPMB believes 
that designing programmes to meet specific markets would be unworkable so no attempt is made 
to have certain growers producing for particular markets (Grundy, 1989). 
3.2.3. Banienfor NZ fresh apples 
Table 3.1. Barriers to Access for New Zealand Fresh apples 1988 
Importing ACCESS BARRIER TYPE Brief Comment 
Country 
Phyto Economic Quota Forex 
Australia X bacteria 
CanadalUS X leaf roller 
EC X new in 1988 
Japan X codling moth 
Korea X codling moth 
China X counter trade 
.. 
. ". 
India X government ban 
Indonesia X government ban 1983 
Philippines reopened 1988 
Taiwan X ban in 1988 
Venezuela X government ban 
Source: Seminar for Trade Journalists NZAPMB, 1988 
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The Government and the NZAPMB encourage producers to adapt their traditional production 
and marketing routines to persuade other countries to allow NZ apples to enter into their 
markets. 
NZ has an interest in seeing that standards, technical specifications and testing procedures 
do not become technical barriers to trade and that certification and accreditation by NZ agencies 
are accepted internationally (MERT, 1990). 
All the importers of apples maintain a system of marketing orders to regulate and protect 
their domestic production, even though the system differs widely in its restrictive impact on 
trade. 
As seen in Table 3.1., NZ faces a variety of import barriers in world markets. The most 
important types are: phytosanitary, economic, quota restrictions and lack of foreign exchange or 
central regulations. These barriers affect major current and potential markets. 
3.3. CURRENT NZ APPLE MARKETS 
The main NZ apple export markets are countries located in Northern Hemisphere (figure 3.3.), 
because seasonal characteristics offer advantage for NZ supplies (Appendix 3.3.). As NZ's season 
is offset six months from northern hemisphere producers, NZ apples have not traditionally 
cont1icted with sales of local producers. However, new storage technology has tended to increase 
the competition. 
The rate of growth of apple exports and market shares has changed over time. Exports 
have grown from half a million cartons (18.5 kg) exported in 1949 to over seven million cartons 
today. Apple export production in 1990 was 20 thousand tonnes (NZ Dept. of Statistics). 
The export of fresh fruit requires a certain level of skill and sophistication in postharvest 
operations, including grading, packaging, storing and transporting. Quality control, compliance 
with strict health and sanitary standards, and efficient packaging are important for export 
marketing. 
Destinations of NZ Fresh Apples 
Exports 1985-1989 
_ North America 
~ EC/Europe 
§ Others 
Source: NZAPMB 
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Figure 3.3. Destination of New Zealand Exports of Fresh Pipfruit 
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1989 
The most important importing and rapidly expanding markets for NZ apples are EC and 
US (F1gure 3.3.), with about 70 per cent and 19 per cent respectively of total NZ apple exports 
(NZAPMB, 199Oa). Other markets such as Asian countries, have increased their imports in 
recent years (NZAPMB, 1991). 
3.3.l. European ComDDmlly 
The major apple producers in EC are: Italy, France, Germany and Spain. The share of apples 
in the total value of EC agricultural production is about 2 per cent and it is one-third of the fruit 
and nut sector total production value. EC is also an importer of apples. The volume of imports 
reached 610 thousand tonnes in 1989 (OECD, 1991). 
Apples Production in Selected Markets 
Australia, Ee, Japan and US 
Thousands 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
_ Australia ~ EO ~Japan ~us 
Figure 3.4. Apples Production in selected markets 
3.3.1.1. EC Policy 
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The EC wants to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, availability of 
supplies, reasonable prices to consumers and steady market conditions protected from price 
nuctuations. EC implemented the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which protects European 
markets by putting up barriers to imports. The genera) framework of the apple market in the 
CAP is based on: quality standards applying at all marketing stages; producer organisations; 
producer price support and trade policies, with imports subject to tariffs, the reference price 
system and preferential agreements (OECD, 1991). 
3.3.1.1. Apple Trade between NZ and EC 
The EC is the most important export market for NZ apples. In 1986, imports from the Southern 
Hemisphere were increased with a record of 440 thousand tonnes. Of this, 95 thousand tonnes 
18 
were from NZ. Import controls, such as a form of import licence system, were considered prior 
to the 1987 season, but were not imposed. In 1989, the EC was the major export market with 
around 66 per cent of all NZ's apple exports. In 1991, exports to the EC increased by more than 
5 per cent with respect to 1990 (MAF, 1987; MAF, 1991; NZAPMB, 1991). 
The EC attempts to have a transparent trade, and only once did they impose a NTB on 
NZ apples. This was in 1988 when the EC established a quota of 115 thousand tonnes, 12 per 
cent below expected NZ exports. This quota was contrary to a GATT ruling allowing sales to 
Europe by Southern Hemisphere producers in the otT-season. Four months later, the quota was 
lifted (Hoadley, 1989). 
During 1989, The Economic Commission regulated imports on two bases: firstly, the 
quota was restricted to 130 thousand tonnes per year and secondly, size restrictions were imposed 
(Grundy, 1989; Nicholson, 1990; Monigatti, 1991; OECD, 1991). 
Apples have two types of nontaritT measures applied in EC: health and sanitary 
regulations (HS) and other price distorting restrictions (OM) (Hillman, 1990). 
Within Europe, Switzerland constitutes a special case, as it is free of Fire Blight. To 
control the entrance of the disease, it selects the certification of the apples from an area free of 
this disease, or absent of symptoms of the disease in the orchard during the corresponding 
growth period. Before 1985 imports of NZ apples into Switzerland were permitted without 
restriction (AQIS, 1989). Switzerland's requirement for NZ apples Is only that of a visual survey 
for each export block (MAFQual, 19900. 
There is no formal voluntary restraint agreement (VRA) between NZ and the EC. 
Instead, NZ supplies estimates of proposed exports which are non nnding but provide market 
information to the EC Commission. Once in a while, VRAs are agreed to with some other apple 
exporters to the EC. The Commission seeks data involving production and export projections, 
before the beginning of the South Hemisphere season and commits itself not to take measures as 
10llg HS imports do not exceed an amount which can be absorbed by the market without creating 
dimculties. Between 1989 and 1991, the total VRA amount has been maintained annually at 580 
thousand tonnes (OECD, 1991). 
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Apple imports into the EC are subject to a combination of ad valorem import tariffs and 
the reference price system, and sometimes a VRA for some exporters to the EC. Import tariffs 
for apples vary during the year as follows: at 14 per cent from August to December, 8 per cent 
from January to March, and 6 per cent from April to July. More than 80 per cent of the 
Imports are subject to an Import tariff of 6 per cent. A reference price may be used to impose 
a countervailing duty. This price Is determined by the average producer price during the 
preceding three seasons and the trend in the internal EC production and transport costs. Under 
this system no apple exporter to the EC has an incentive to price below the reference price as this 
will trigger the application of the countervailing duty. The reference price system determines 
that poor quality Imported apples of less value cannot compete with other imported higher 
quality produce In the EC. Therefore, It attracts high-quality apple Imports into the Community 
(OECD,I991). 
The EC provides clear specifications that offer transparency to its market's requirements. 
They refer to size, quality, sanitation, etc., and could have a protective effect on health and 
sanitary domestic conditions. 
3.3.2. The United States of Amerial 
The US is the world's largest producer of commercial apples, with about 10 per cent of world 
apple production (Appendix 2). The high yielding modern orchard planting system is located in 
Washington State, Michigan and California (Appendix 5.2.1.). In the US, there were dimculties 
because of the rapid expansion of the production (greater than the increase of consumption). 
Fresh apple consumption accounts for over 50 per cent of production (MAF, 1991; OECD, 1991). 
In 1990 the US apple industry produced just over forty four hundred thousand tonnes 
of apples, of which 58 per cent were sold in the fresh apple market. The volume of fresh apples 
marketed in the US during the 1980s increased about 10 per cent overall (Derek, 1991). The per 
capita consumption of fresh apples rose by around 10 per cent during the period of 1985-1995 
(OECD, 1991). 
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Most US fresh apple imports come from Canada and the Southern hemisphere countries 
like NZ and Chile, especially during the February· May period. This market has potential 
growth in demand for some varieties. In 1987, the US apple imports totalled 139 thousand 
tonnes. The US is NZ's second largest apple export market, importing about 20% of NZ total 
apples exports (36 thousand tonnes) (Appendix 5.2.2.). The market gap was mainly r11led by 
Chile and Argentina, which have earlier marketing seasons than NZ (MAF, 1987.1991). 
The share of imported apples in the US fresh apple consumption is low, around 5 per 
cent. In the medium term, it expects apple yields to remain stable. Apple exports could 
eventually expand, especially in some Asian and Nordic countries (OECD, 1991). 
3.3.2.1. Apple sedor in US 
The Apple sector in the US is relatively free from government policy intervention. Import of 
apples in the US have some constraint related to considerations of health, security and 
phytosanitary reasons (OECD, 1991). 
During 1989,333 thousand tonnes were exported to US, which is around 18% of the total 
fresh apple export for that year. The value of domestic production is US$1 billion, contributing 
0.6 per cent of all agricultural production and 12.5 per cent of the total for the fruit and nut 
sector (Hay, 1991; OECD, 1991). Export revenues for Washington apples were estimated at more 
than $140 million for 1990 (Beer, 1990). 
There are some institutions that support apple growers and traders in the US. The best 
known are the International Apple Institute (IAI), and Washington Apple Commission (WAC). 
These can provide a powerful lobby for growers and traders in time of difficulty (Ray, 1991). 
3.3.2.2. Apple Trade between US and NZ 
The NZ apple industry has an excellent reputation in the US market. It has created a niche in 
the US market with supplies of Gala, Braeburn, Spartan, Golden Delicious, and Granny Smith 
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apples (Ray, 1991). 
Imports from some sources have occasionally been adversely atTected by US health and 
phytosanitary regulations (OEeD, 1991). From time to time, particular problems with 
quarantine pests have placed the USDA preclearance programme at severe risk. This is the case 
of Hawkes Bay and Nelson in the past. 
3.4. NZ POTENTIAL MARKETS 
3.4.1. Japan 
The IlberaUsatlon of the· restrictions concerning fruit might have important Implications for 
Japanese apple growers. The importation of apples could lead to a more competitive domestic 
market, and thus, in turn, act to depress producer prices (OEeD, 1991). 
3.4.1.1. Apple industry in Japan 
Policy formulation for the apple sector is coordinated by the Japanese government jointly with 
producer cooperatives (Beer, 1990; OEeD, 1991). 
During 1970s the government stimulated the move of rice land into other crops including 
apples, but in 1980s new plantings of apple trees have b~n discouraged to avoid the probability 
of excessive production. Japan is a major apple producer and accounts for 2.5 per cent of world 
fresh apple production with more than one million tonnes in 1989. Apples are cultivated in the 
harsher climates of North·western Tohoku: Aomori (47 % ), Yamagata (7 % ), and Naganao (21 % ) 
In the Japanese Alps (OEeD, 1991). 
The current gross value of apple production is US ~1010 million, contributing 1.3 per cent 
of all agricultural output in Japan, and around 20% of the total value of fruit production 
(OEeD, 1991; Rothacher, 1989). 
In the long term, the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries of Japan (MAFF) 
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projections expect an increase of fresh apple production of 1 per cent per annum up to the year 
2000. Japanese trade in apples is an insignificant share of total production. Exports, mostly 
destined to Asian countries, are about one thousand tonnes annually which is less than 0.1 % of 
the marketed production (OECD, 1991). 
Japanese health measures and sanitary regulations are applied to imports of apples. 
Quarantine problems have arisen regarding the access of apples to Japanese markets 
(MAFQUAL, 1988; Anderson, 1986; Hillman, 1990; Grundy, 1989). 
Before 1990 Japan did not approve the entry of apples from any country because of the 
quarantine regulations relating to colding moth (AQIS, 1990). However, after 10 years of 
negotiation, the US could earn the right to export its apples to Japan In 1990. The US Access to 
Japan was approved In March 1989, but only in January 1990 did MAFF formally accept 
USDA's proposal for a two component treatment for colding moth on Red Delicious and Golden 
DeUcious apples (Beer, 1990). The access of US apples to this market, opens new possibilities for 
NZ's apples (MAFQUAL, 1989c). 
3.4.1.2. NZ apples Access Proposal to Japan 
NZ has been negotiating access for fresh NZ apples to the Japanese market from 1970. Japan 
is a potential major ~rket but maintains zero imports of NZ's apples because of phytosanitary 
reasons. 
The matters related to this access are being jointly worked out by NZ DSIR, MAF, and 
NZAPMB (MAFQUAL, 1990b). The first meeting between authorities from NZ and Japan took 
place in 1987 (MAFQUAL, 1991c). The Japanese draft protocol for NZ apples referred to the 
most important phytosanitary problems: Fire Blight, leaf roller, colding moth, and mite control. 
Japan's legislation does not specifically prohibit the entry of apples and pears from countries 
where Fire BUght occurs, but, it is regarded as a serious pes!. Thus, only apples free from Fire 
Blight will be exported to Japan (MAFQUAL, 1989c). 
Negotiations towards establishing an acceptable protocol with Japan are still being held. 
23 
NZ has now met most of the Japanese quarantine regulations for fresh apples and is waiting for 
a final agreement to market access (OECD, 1991). NZ hopes to gain access to this market within 
the next three years (NZAPMB, 1991). 
There is agreement on basic points on the measures to prevent Fire Blight such as: no 
other host plants, or plants infected with the disease should exist within the distance of 500 
metres of the designated orchards, and appropriate disinfestation measures should be taken. 
Concerning the export check on Fire BUght: apples should be selected and treated to prevent live 
bacteria from being found on it. Also, apples should be packed with new packing materials and 
they should be collected using sterilized collection boxes kept exclusively for their use 
(MAFQUAL, 1991e). 
Government support to Japanese apple growers is provided indirectly through 
Phytosanitary regulations. These regulations essentially prohibit all apple imports into Japan 
trom countries which do not fulftl Japanese quarantine standards (OECD, 1991). 
3.4.1 Australia 
Australia is a major exporter of agricultural products and also it imports a wide range of them. 
It Is the chairman of the Cairns Group in GATT. Ansley 1990, suggests that Australia is a major 
tree-trade mover, which is ftghting for open farm markets. 
3.4.2.l. AwItnIian apple industry 
Australia was once the biggest apple and pear exporter in the southern hemisphere. In 1971, it 
exported eight million cartons of apples, while NZ exported only three. Now NZ exports nearly 
ten million cartons and Australia in 1989 did not manage a million (NZAPMB, 1989). 
The Australian apple and pear industry comprises some 3,500 individual growers and 
several co-operatives. In 1986, it had a total annual harvest of around 17 million boxes of apples 
and seven million boxes of pears. Australia's total apple export levels have been declining largely 
/ 
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due to the increasing cost difficulties that the exporters had faced in the movement of fruit to 
their traditional markets 20 thousand km away in the UK. and Europe. Apple exports to these 
markets in 1984 were 267 thousands of cartons. Since 1982 Australia is looking for nearby 
markets of South East Asia in particular Malaysia and Singapore (National Farmer's Federation, 
1986). 
There are seven major apple growing regions in Australia. All six states have apples and 
pear production. Each of the fruit growing states of Australia has a ditTerent type of 
administration. Australian industry bodies are: The Australian Apple and Pear Corporation, The 
Australian Apple and Pear Growers Association, and the Apple and Pear Industry Research 
Foundation. In general, apple growers individually maintain the status of a principal In growing, 
harvesting, storage, and selling the crop. This situation is opposite to NZ where the crop is 
acquired by a single body and marketed on a national basis by the NZAPMB (National Farmer's 
Federation, 1986). 
The Quarantine Proclamation No. 20P made under the Quarantine Act 1908, prohibits 
the Importation into Australia, (except with the permission of the Minister) of all plants or parts 
of plants that are hosts of Fire Blight that are grown in any country where It exists (AQIS, 1989). 
NZ seems to be the most competitive market for Australian apples. They are competitive 
producers that are intending to enter into Japan and other Asian markets. Also, this rivalry 
occurs in other countries because of their otT-season production with respect to the Northern 
Hemisphere (NZAPMB, 1988; OECD, 1991). 
3.4.z.t. NZ-Australia BUatera1 Agreements 
The trade liberalisation movement has been encouraged in Australia and NZ by the Bilateral 
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement and by the unilateral reduction of protectionism. 
There are some bilateral agreements where Australia has obligations with NZ for example under 
the Australia-New Zealand Protocol of Harmonisation of Quarantine Procedure to the 
ANZCERTA signed in 1988. This agreement provided for the phased removal of duty rates by 
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1 January 1988 and the progressive elimination of quotas and technical barriers to trade (TBTs) 
by 1995 (AQIS, 1990; Hoadley, 1989). 
ANZCERTA promised to achieve harmonisation of common quarantine standards and 
procedures by 1 July 1990; to apply any quarantine on related import restrictions based on 
regional rather than national distribution of diseases or pests where this occurs in the exporting 
country; to work towards a prompt solution of the quarantine problems hindering trans-Tasman 
trade In certain goods, Including apples and to establish a consultative group to oversight 
progress under the protocol (AQIS, 1990). This trade Agreement centres on the removal of the 
visible trade barriers between those two nations. ANZCERTA is also trying to change a range 
of other polices to co-ordinate them6• The major change in policies should lead to the 
IIberalisation of apple import barriers for Australia under ANZCERTA. It could lead to 
development ofNZ exports of apples once Australia ratittes the protocol to remove Its quarantine 
regulations against Fire Blight. 
3.5. NZ SELECTED MARKETS: GENERAL ANALYSIS 
In this section the aim is to compare the different markets' situations with respect to the apple 
trade from NZ. Phytosanitary regulations constitute the most common nontariff barriers in NZ 
apples. 
In general, all the markets should want apples ~th the characteristics of high levels of 
purity and safety, and of good quality without damage from insects and disease. High standards 
of sanitation and quality control are desirable for any country. We discover different cases. The 
US, and EC, do not directly have non tariff barriers affecting exports of NZ apples. However, 
they have solid norms for quality and sanitary characteristics. Japan and Australia have closed 
their markets to NZ apples, both of them are using phytosanitary regulations. 
6 The objective 10 of the proposed arrangements states that: 
.. the gradual and progressi ve liberalisation of trade across the 
Tasman on all goods produced in either country on basis that 
would benefit both nations" (McCurran, 1986). 
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In contrast, the US and the EC continue an open market. Their domestic apple Industry 
may not be in direct competition with imports from NZ, because the time of supply is different. 
The transparency of information is important with respect to the specific apples' characteristics 
and requirements. 
Quarantine concerns of overseas governments are often the oftlcial reason against 
allowing entry of imported fruit. 
In aU the case studies, there are different measures and systems of barriers that tend to 
protect their domestic production. Clearly, the agreements of trade have different implications 
at the bUateral level. It is not possible to study all the countries in the same context. 
27 
CHAPTER 4 
A CASE STUDY: FIRE BLIGHT BARRIER AFFECTING NZ APPLE EXPORTS TO 
AUSTRALIA 
In this section we wiD explore the process and the implications of phytosanitary barriers (Fire 
Blight) on NZ apple exports to Australia. This chapter begins with a brief technical review of 
the Fire Blight disease. The second part is concerned with a description of the NZ proposal to 
gain access to the Australian market. This is followed by the bioeconomic risk analysis used to 
evaluate the risk of this disease from Australia's point of view. The last part focuses on the 
international political ground and a discussion of the banning of this potential market from a NZ 
and Australian view point. 
4.1. FIRE BLIGHT DISEASE 
Fire Blight occurs in most of the maYor apple producing countries, including US, Canada, Chile, 
most of Europe and NZ. Only few producer countries do not have the disease such as South 
Africa, Japan and Switzerland (AQIS, 1989). 
Fire Blight is caused by the bacterium Erwinia amylovora (Burrill, Winslow et al.) which 
Is a necrogen7• Hosts vary widely in susceptibility, they are In the family Rosaceae, and the most 
susceptible are in the sub-family Pomoideae (apples BIl;d pears) (Bradbury, 1986). 
The disease may attack blossoms, twigs, spurs, fruit, shoots and branches. Infection 
occurre through blossoms or wounds and multiply. The bacteria may be spread to blossoms, 
young shoots and wounds from exudate by man, birds, insects (including bees) and mechanical 
means (wind and driving rain). Infected blossoms and new shoots die and discolour suddenly. 
Progressively they become translucent, then turn brown and tinally black as if damaged by tire. 
Cankers develop on branches and twigs following invasion of the tissues, and are initially reddish 
~ecrosis refers to local areas of cell death. Pathogens 
causing necrosis will be called necrogens (Billing, 1987:3) 
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In colour. Severely Infected trees look as though scorched by fire, a symptom which gave the 
disease its name (Atkinson, 1971; AQIS, 1990). At one extreme, a canker may form a 
progression cease at the base of a blossom cluster; at the other, a young tree may be invaded 
from top to bottom and killed in a single season (Bradbury, 1986; BUling, 1987). 
In spring the symptom Is death of small fruits shortly after petal fall. Infected young 
fruits show a brown, soft rot, with characteristic droplets of ooze on the surface. Fruits nearing 
maturity are apparently immune to attack (Billing, 1987). 
Table 4.1. Some field factors used in Fire Blight risk assessment 
Characteristics field factors 
host phenology flowering and shoot growth periods 
host susceptibiUty cultivar age, cultural factors 
number of susceptible targets blossoms, shoots 
risk of damage storms, insects 
risk of inoculum spread rain, wind insects 
inoculum potential past and current infections 
alternative hosts hawthorn, cotoneaster 
Source: BUling, 1987 
As can be seen in Table 4.1., there are a wide range of field factors that have infiuence 
for accurate risk assessment. Some of the epidemiological factors to consider with respect to this 
disease are: establishment of infection, disease development rates, host susceptibility, damaging 
storms, presence of alternative hosts nearby, pre-bloom infection, blossom infection, calcium and 
potassium nutrition, etc. (Billing, 1989; Wimalajeewa, 1990). 
4.1.1_ Transmission and Detection 
The bacteria are poor competitors with other organisms and are unable to withstand exposure 
to sunlight and drying conditions. According to AQIS (1990), these microorganisms are not likely 
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to survive long enough to transfer to apple seedlings which have grown from the seed of an 
infected apple. In fully mature and packed fruit E. amylovora has only been detected in washing 
from the calyx end and not from the fruit epidermis. The pathogen is more likely to survive in 
association with the dried remnants of the flower parts. In experiments with trees showing 
symptoms, the disease was not detected In seeds (pips) of apple fruit samples from any of the 
fruits with either calyx or peduncle infestations. 
Trade in apparently healthy mature apple fruit has not been proven to be responsible for 
establishment of Fire Blight in a country previously free of the disease. Thus, it is unlikely that 
seeds of fruit exported from orchards without the disease symptoms constitute a means of 
disseminating the disease (Hale, 1987; Hale, 1989; AQIS, 1990). 
AQIS (1989) remarked that there is no evidence that this disease has been Introduced into 
a tree country by imported apple fruit. Very little research had been done in relation to the 
transmission of the disease through movement of fruit (Landos, 1990). Billing (1990) stated that 
many concepts In Fire Blight research rest on probabilities rather than on certain knowledge. 
4.1~ Control measures 
There is a wide range of control strategies for this disease. . Primary prevention relies on strict 
quarantine conditions on the entry of budwood and plant material. If the disease is established, 
it Is possible to use chemical sprays, pruning, sanitation, tree surgery, removal of other host 
plants, cuitural practices, insect control, and· biological and integrated controls. The cost will 
depend on the selected system (AQIS, 1990). 
Varietal susceptibility is present in pears and apples. In a prediction model of Thompson 
(1987) used to estimate Fire Blight in NZ, the results show that many areas of NZ are conducive 
to the disease. However, disease incidence is much le~s than predicted suggesting other 
t!nvironmental factors may be restricting Fire Blight develoJ: mente Populations of epiphytic and 
saprophytic bacteria (E. herbicola) may be restricting the development of the bacteria in NZ by 
providing some degree of biological control. There are some areas in NZ where Fire Blight 
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would not· be Ukely to occur very often. The apple production in Riwaka areas of the South 
Island did not have any risk years in the years investigated (Thompson, 1987). 
4.1.3. Economic losses 
Cunningham 1931 (cited by Atkinson, 1971), stated that when the disease first appeared in NZ 
during the 1920s, it destroyed many acres of pear trees, but after two or three years its effects 
were Umited to the death of a few pear branches. In later years, it became regarded by most 
growers as a minor disease. 
In response to the initial outbreak, the Fire Blight Act 1922 defined and gazetted fruit 
growing districts and regulations, making it compulsory to cut back hawthorns in those areas. 
When this disease appeared an embargo was placed on export to Australia from NZ of 
susceptible nursery trees. Later this embargo was extended to apple and pear fruit and is still 
in force (Atkinson, 1971). Losses from Fire Blight arise from a loss of production and from direct 
costs due to spray applications·. 
4.2. ACCESS PROPOSALS: HISTORICAL REVIEW 
The purpose of this section is to review the proposals made by NZ to gain access to the 
Australian market, in which NZ apples have been ba~med for phytosanitary reasons especially 
Fire BUght. 
During the last six years, scientists from both countries in the "Australian Access 
Committee Meeting" had been working together on the development of the protocol access of NZ 
apples into the Australian market as contained in Table 4.2. 
8With respect to the economic consequences of the disease 
Wimalajeewa said: "the most serious economic losses would result 
from the restriction of overseas market opportunities, by those 
considerations which presently apply to countries where Fire 
Blight is known to occur" (Wimalajeewa, 1987:59) 
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Table 4.2. Timescale of the Access Proposal of NZ's apples to Australian market 
1985 Conference on Fire Blight indicating that NZ was affected by the disease 
1986 Nov Start the Negotiations. Purpose: prevent the establishment of the disease 
in Australia through the importation of NZ apples. 
Basically the proposal submitted by NZ for Switzerland was provided to 
Australia. 
1987 AQIS requested the BRR to examine this Issue 
1988 The proposal was rejected, following technical evaluation (BRR) 
There is no evidence that this disease has been Introduced into a free 
country following carriage by imported apple fruit. 
Australian Pathologists visited NZ production areas 
, 
1989 Jun Requirements: low risk area, no disease host within 0,25 km, treatment 
with chlorine and sampling checked by DNA probe. 
1990 Inspection Is a NZ responsibility (Draft Agreement). 
HPC recommends protocol not to be ratit1ed. Reason: possibility of 
establishment of the disease from this source. 
AQIS has ruled that a draft proposal for NZ imports did not provide 
sutlicient safeguards against Fire Blight. 
1991 Mar Conditions: MPL =1 infected applel million pieces arrival in Australia. 
(NZ would need to sample 6 million fruit if tolerance P =0.95) 
Source: MAFQUAL, 1989; MAFQUAL, 1990; MAFQUAL, 1991 ; AQIS, 1990; HPC, 1990; The 
Press, 1990. 
In 1985 a paper was presented at an international conference on Fire Blight indicating that the 
bacterial disease was widely distributed throughout NZ. ~egotiations for apple access to Australia 
started in early 1986, when the subject was formally raised at the annual Australian and NZ 
technical consultations on plant quarantine. The sanitary requirements holding for apple imports 
into Australia are contained into a protocol outlined by quarantine authorities (AQIS, 1990; 
Landos, 1990; MAFQUAL, 19900. Basically the same proposal submitted by NZ to Switzerland 
to gain access for NZ apples was provided to Australia in 1986. 
In 1986 a Swiss Government otlicial came to NZ to investigate Fire Blight in apple 
orchards. He said that his Impression before he arrived in NZ was that NZ was riddled with Fire 
Blight. However, he discovered that the bacterial disease was extremely dift1cult to t1nd and that 
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orchard management practices against it were well-developed and effective (Massey, 1986). 
Before the Australian Department of Primary Industry Energy (DPffi) signed the 
agreement in 1988, they circulated copies of it among industry groups and other scientific bodies 
for comment. The proposal specit1ed measures that would be employed to minimise the risk of 
the disease becoming established In Australia as a result of imports. The proposal was rejected 
In 1988 following technical evaluation by the BRR with other Australian institutions. Australia 
believed that there was ample justit1cation maintaining the prohibition on the import of apples \ 
i (MAFQUAL, 1986). In NZ, Fire Blight was not considered important as a domestic problem with 
apples and could be readily controlled. On the other hand it was regarded in Australia as a 
problem that should be excluded at all costs, but there was clearly still imperfect knowledge on 
the epidemiology of the· disease (See Section 4.1.). 
Between 1988-89 the Australian Access Committee Meeting worked on this issue. The 
draft of the agreement between MAFQUAL and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection 
Service (AQIS) concerning the access of apples into Australia included various strategies. A 
maximum pest limit (MPL) was suggested of nil detection of bacteria on one thousand fruit per 
ten thousand trees using the DNA hybridisation method. The requirements for export apples to 
Australia were: production from a low risk area followed by a chlorine treatment; phytosanitary 
certificate; inspection by AQIS (visiting production areas and laboratories in NZ at any time) to 
validate the performance of the treatment becomes necessary. Registration of the packhouses and 
storage apart from other lines of fruit was also considered. 
The production requirements suggested· by Australia for use in NZ Include: selection of 
regions which are disease free, registered growers, absence of orchard symptoms, sampling and 
testing of export fruit (one thousand immature fruits per variety to be exported, per orchard 
block), inspection zones and inspection of apples pollination, packing and storage inspection. 
Plans within Australia include: notit1cation of failure in the treatment by MAFQUAL and 
Detection of failure in the treatment by AQIS (AQIS, 1989-9('; MAFQUAL, 1989b). No Fire 
Blight host is permitted within 0.25 km of apples sourced for export to Australia. However, AQIS 
has ruled that the draft proposal for NZ imports does not provide sufficient safeguards against 
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. Fire BUght (The Press, 1990). AQIS based decisions on biological, and, on economic analysis and 
other risks associated with importation (AQIS 1990; Landos, 1990). 
In 1990, the Horticultural Policy Council (HPC), submitted the Fire Blight working 
group's report to the Minister. The HPC 1990, concluded that the risk of Fire BUght establishing 
Itself in Australia following carriage by apples from NZ is low. Nevertheless, it recommended the 
draft protocol not be ratifted. The reason was: the possibility of establishment of the disease from 
this source (Landos, 1990). 
Since 1991, technical consultations have continued on the adequacy of NZ protocol 
conditions. NZ invited the Australian officials to provide an indication of the MLP of infested 
fruit. The Australian authorities suggested conditions such as the level of protection of the MPL 
of Infested fruit being of one infected apple per two million pieces on arrival in Australia. 
However, this level of MPL is not realistic, as to meet this tolerance at a 95 per cent probability 
requires that six million NZ fruit would need to be sampled (MAFQUAL, 1991c). The sample 
fruit will be drawn from all growers in the designated inspection, six hundred fruit sample from 
each shipment lot. This is to give a 95 per cent confidence that a 0.5 per cent infection rate would 
be detected (Landos, 1990). This would be a very costly monitoring requirement. 
Inspection of the apples is a responsibility of the NZ authorities under the conditions of 
the draft agreement. AQIS accept field inspections· by overseas' authorities as a basis for 
phytosanltary certificate issue. It considers that there is no justification for testing for Fire Blight 
on arrival of fruit to Australia to provide added quaral)tine security above that achieved by the 
producers in NZ (AQIS, 1990). 
In the Australian Access Committee Meeting, several steps have been Incorporated to 
provide further assurance that the disease will not be introduced and established in Australia. 
The proposals specified measures that would be adopted to minimise the risk of the Fire Blight 
becoming established in Australia as a result of imports. Therefore, the access strategy was forced 
to take that of proving an area was highly unlikely to be conduci'i'e to Fire Blight coupled with 
a series of additional treatments. 
During this period of time NZ carried out a great deal of research work in Fire Blight. 
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It included: detection tests, infection, transmission, control and other important technical research 
in the disease. It had developed criteria for exporting NZ apples, they included sourcing apples 
from an area with low risk, a post harvest dip treatment (chlorine), mature apples, visual orchard 
assessment, using a DNA probe, 0.25 km from alternative hosts and introducing the ISO 9002 
certification system (MAFPOL, 1990; Monlgattl, 1991). 
4.3. BIOECONOMIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
Australia has maintained tliat importation of apples increases the risk of Fire Blight. These 
phytosanltary barriers· can be analyzed using the concept of bio-economlc risk assessment as 
carried out as part of decision making on quarantine matters. A special review of the disease 
was made before banning it. During this review process, the aim was to examine the risks and 
the benefits of the importation of apples. 
The assessment was carried out in two parts. The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (ABARE) has made an assessment of the economic components of the 
over aU risks. The Australia Bureau of Rural Resources (BRR) was in charge of evaluating the 
biological impact of the decision of the access of NZ apples. 
4.3.1. The Biological Impact 
The BRR considers low risk of introduction of Fire Blight into Australia by the importation of 
\ - " ,..~ 
mature and apparently healthy apples from NZ (AQIS, 1990). 
Roberts of BRR in his paper: " The consequences of Establishment of Fire Blight in 
Australia, A Biological risk Assessment" suggested that apple production could drop 15 to 20 
per cent and pear production 48 to SO per cent, if all apple and pear production areas in 
mainland Australia became diseased (the worst scenario) (AQIS, 1990:18). 
The potential risks of Fire Blight infection are speculative because the applicability of the 
models to Australian conditions cannot be tested (Billing, 1989; Wimalajeewa, 1990). 
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Although Australia has so far remained free from Fire Blight, there is increasing risk of 
the disease being introduced with propagating material from apples. All propagation wood from 
apples and other rosaceous sources will only be imported from approved sources and should have 
originated from properties free of Fire Blight during the current and previous seasons 
(Wimalajeewa, 1987; Wimalajeewa, 1990). 
4.3.l. The economical Impact 
ABARE's report represents the economic component of a new way in which risk assessment can 
be embraced when dealing with quarantine issues (MAFQUAL, 1990d). ABARE's analyst on 
bioeconomic risk assessment, Hall, described the approach as one of "Probability x money"'. 
In this approach the greater the economic impact on the domestic industry of the unintended 
introduction of a disease, the lower the acceptable risk of introduction of a disease, and vice versa 
(MAFQUAL, 1990e; MAFQUAL, 19900. 
b'~1(" ~? ~ 
The Cost-Benefit analysis used by ABARE considers the problem in the importer country. 
It focused on Australian supply side effects but does not take into account the bUateral trade 
relationship. 
The ABARE analysis of NZ apple access proposal identities probabilities of gains and 
losses if imports are allowed. It looked at the impact on domestic producers of competition from 
Imported apples. In Australia, the effect that NZ apples could have on the domestic pear 
Industry was regarded as an externality. Any intervention is based on the existence of a market 
fallure.Quarantine, the solution implemented, is considered as a public good. However, it 
represents a form of government regulatory intervention in a competitive market economy. 
(Hinchy, 1990; Hinchy, 1991) 
In order to measure the impact of the disease, ABARE ran simulation experiments. It 
9 He said that this exercise would make transparent the 
monetary value of the quarantine barrier, and ensure that 
Minist~rs were aware of the extent to which this concern might be 
driving the industry's opposition (MAFQUAL, 1990e) 
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used a model of an orchard in which 79 per cent of the area was planted In apples and 21 per 
cent in pears. These simulation experiments are based on the forecast that NZ exports of apples 
to Australia could grow at between three thousands tonnes and seven thousands tonnes a year. 
They also estimate losses from Fire BUght of 20 per cent of apples and 50 per cent of pears, In 
the absence of control measures. The cash flow of the sample orchard was estimated to decline 
" 
by 36 per cent. It was estimated using these simulations that Australia would beneftt between 
A $0.2 millions and A $2.8 millions a year by 1995. However, there is considerable uncertainty 
in this analysis about the cost effectiveness of available control measures at the orchard level 
(AQIS, 1990). 
Victoria's Goulburn Valley is the dominant pear and apple producing region. Studies 
suggest that if the disease took hold in this Valley, 90 per cent of AustraHa's main pear crop 
would be affected. The possibility exists that it would spread to other regionslO (Ansley, 1990). 
It is considered impossible to estimate the probability of an apple carrying Fire Blight 
bacteria leading to the establishment of the disease in Australia" (AQIS, 1990) 
Under these specific assumptions, the estimated annual loss if Fire Blight became 
established in one major apple growing region was A $39 millions12 and an average loss for 
Australia of A $44.4 millions (AQIS, 1989-1990). 
In this ABARE's assumption, the critical probability for the entry, infestation and 
10 If the disease became established in the Valley, the 
estimated annual loss was $77 millions. 
11 " If the probability of transmission was assumed to be 1 
in 10, 000, 000 then the establishment of this disease in Australia 
from imported fruit might be expected to occur once every 22 
years, based on the worst case scenario. This worst case assumes 
that 0.45% of all apples entering Australia carry Fire Blight" 
(AQIS, 1990:11). 
12 When it was considered over the seven major apple growing 
regions, the estimated loss of $ 39 millions for an apple growing 
region was weighted by a factor of 6/7 and added to the estimated 
loss of $77 millions for the Goulburn Valley weighted by a factor 
of 1/7 (AQIS 1990). 
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dissemination of Fire Blight is one in 104013 (AQIS, 1990). 
There is a high degree of uncertainty about the basic biological and economic data used 
In the ABARE analysis (AQIS, 1990). The conclusions by ABARE do not influence the AQIS 
decision because they are linked to probabilities of Fire Blight establishment which cannot be 
- ,~-
assessed. In the process of tlnalizing the decision on the above, some impact groups have made 
representations. 
4A. POUTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE IMPORT BAN 
Australian-policy can be interpreted in different ways. From one point of view, prohibiting 
access to NZ apples can be seen as a way to reduce the risk of introduction of Fire Blight disease. 
However, there are no technical studies in transmission, propagation, detection, infection and \ 
i 
reproduction of the disease in the Australian environment. From another view point, this policy 
can make sense to protect Australia's domestic production from foreign competition. 
None of Australia's existing markets for apples and pears have restrictions on the import 
of fruits from countries where Fire Blight occurs. However, Australia has a favoured position in 
obtaining access to Japan because Fire Blight is not present (AQIS, 1989). 
In the event, the rejection of the access proposal for importing apples from NZ produced 
different reactions. On the one hand it was easy to identify those who agreed with this decision, 
most of the producers in the industry. On the other hand, there were those who support free 
trade schemes and were against Sanitary lind Phytosanitary (SPS) measures being used without 
scientitlc basis. Political pressures resulting from the characteristics of Australian production and 
trade underlie this decision (See Section 3.4.2.). 
13 On one hand, if the assessed probability were less than 
1 in 1040, the benefits would exceed the costs if imports were 
permitted. On the other hand, if they were greater than 1 in 
1040, the cost would exceed the benefits. 
" 
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4.4.1. International obligations 
As a contracting party to the GATT, Australia has agreed not to use quarantine measures in an 
unjustified way to protect its industries against foreign competition in domestic markets. There 
are two Important features in the principle of equivalency of different SPS: measures meeting 
and procedures for consultation and dispute settlement (AQIS, 1990). 
The measure of the protection accorded Australian apple growers by the Fire Blight 
related quarantine restrictions will come under scrutiny by competitor apple producing countries. 
There are some International organisms that can be helpful in this trade issue such as: 
ANZCERTA, GATT and IPPC (MAFQUAL, 1990g). 
4.4~ Australia View Point 
The rejection of the Proposal is believed to have been influenced by interested Australian groups 
and growers. To those who view trade regulation as the proper province of economists and risk 
analysts alone, these findings may be discouraging. On the othe .. hand, those taking the view that 
regulation, is inherently a political act, may find it encouraging that affected parties not only 
participate actively in the regulatory process but do so quite effectively (Ansley, 1990). 
For AQIS, Fire Blight research In Australia must necessarily be restricted to that which 
can be done under strict quarantine security. It does not consider funds for Fire Blight research 
(AQIS 1990). 
The HPC 1990, accepts thnt quarantine must not be used as a barrier to protect domestic 
industries from foreign trade competition. The Council also believes that there is substantiated 
doubt of the level of risk, regarding a quarantine decision. They consider technical inadequacies 
'J " 
of the strategies on which the draft agreement is based14• 
'-'\J e / e, 
14 They based on: (a) There are no Fire Blight free district') 
in NZ. (b) The risk of introducing this disease from apparently 
healthy apple fruit, if there are large volumes and ideal 
conditions a real possibility exists for an outbreak if the 
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4.4.3. NZ VIew Point 
On the other hand, many New Zealanders disagreed with the decision of rejecting the protocol. 
MAF believed the apples would be no threat to Australia's agricultural security. 
Ansley (1990), said that the argument Is over well-advanced plans to accept high 
technology control measures in NZ which would give as much protection as possible against the 
disease slipping into Australia. The biological threat posed to Australia by Fire Blight may not 
be sufficiently understood to make a definitive decision. The gap which exists in the knowledge 
ot fundamental aspects of the disease (See Section 4.1.), and the rapidity of the continuous 
advances In technology produce a scientific complex problem (MAFQUAL, 199Oe). 
All imports, involve a level of risk (Landos, 1990). Australian A.pple and Pear growers' 
association Fire Blight task force would acknowledge that there is a level of risk attached to the 
illegal importation. 
4.4A. General CoosidentioDS 
The Australian regulation in NZ apples through a phytosanitary barrier results in an increase 
ot the cost of NZ export apples. This has different effects on the producer, the Board and at the 
national level as well. The cost of producing in NZ within Australia's requirements may increase 
to a similar or higher level than the cost of producing in Australia. In fact, there are some 
ImpUcit costs In the proposal of exportation. The costs involved include: field trials, fees of the 
inspection control (ports and airports), administrative cost, the phytosanitary certificate, the 
disease to arise from this source. (c) This disease is considered 
one of the most infectious and devasting diseases known to affect 
plants. (d) Once established the disease would be extremely 
difficult and costly to contain and, would be impossible to 
eradicate. (e) Over the last 120 years there has been a big 
amount of research on this topic around the world and it is still 
considered one of the most erratic and unpredictable disease of 
apples and pears. (f) They consider technical inadequacies with 
each of the four principal strategies on which the draft 
agreement is based. (HPC, 1990) 
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destructive sampling of the fruit inspection, quality assurance, certiftcation of local growers and 
extension costs. These costs also include research and development in the new technology applied 
In the apple industry, regulatory system for the norms, the time and resources involved in six 
years of work on the access of this market. For the grower, the higher cost will be related to the 
application of a new technology (agrochemicals, spray programmes of control and prevention, 
labor force, post-harvest disinfection (dip), packaging, container etc). It would be appropriate to 
do an economic analysis of the proposals that include the time, the resources: people, research 
in the technical issue, etc. There are opportunity costs such as the selection of export areas and 
maintaining one speclftc kind of phytosanitary regulation in NZ as supplying country. 
It is dlmcult to conclude that the reason for the rejection of the NZ proposal, Is one of 
just a technical nature. The general impression is that this ban decision may have involved 
political and economic as well as technical issues. 
CHAPTER 5 
ANALYTICAL MODEL 
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The nrst section of this chapter refers to the analytical framework using a partial equilibrium 
model. The second section refers to the assumptions of the model. The third section focuses on 
the development of an eight simultaneous equations model, Its differentiation and solution using 
matrix algebra. It evaluates the effect of the Australian apples import ban on NZ. The tinal 
section is concerned with the empirical analysis. In seeking to understand the pattern of 
distortion of NTBs, the economic effects of Australian quarantine restriction on NZ and Australia 
were examined, with respect to the current situation, if the ban is reduced. The analysis is 
concentrated on four alternative policies changing the current ban and measuring the consequent 
welfare etTects in Australia and NZ. 
5.1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
A partial equilibrium model of the two countries NZ (exporter) and Australia (importer) has 
been used to evaluate the economic effect of the Fire Blight restrictions. 
The quantities traded, produced and consumed in each market relate to the price through 
the specifted demand and supply functions. The domestic supply and demand of importer and 
exporter countries permit us to obtain information, which is used to construct excess supply (ES) 
and excess demand (ED) curves. An equilibrium price Is deftned for given static, supply and 
. demand functions. The supply-demand diagram represents an equilibrium but does not imply 
that price and quantity are constant in a purely competitive market. Moreover, in a real 
dynamic economy, the forces which influence both the level and the slope of demand and supply 
curves are changing. 
There are separate import demand or export supply functions. The parameters of export 
supply and export prices are the elasticity of both export demand and import supply. The 
equilibrium market conditions for a commodity are usually expressed in terms of ES and ED 
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curves. The ES is the horizontal distance between the supply and demand curves in the exporting 
country. The ES curve is positively sloped like conventional supply schedules since the gap 
between supply and demand extends as the price increases. The ED schedule is negatively sloped 
since the gap between the demand and supply curves widen as the price declines. 
Partial equilibrium trade models permit an understanding of the relationship between the 
endogenous variables: ED, ES and Prices: Australian apples price P A andNZ apples price Pm 
In response to variation in exogenous variables such as regulatory costs in NZ. Changes in 
exogenous variables produce falls or increases in the endogenous variables P, ED and ES. 
The domestic price index (PNJ serves a dual role in the supply functions. First, for a given 
level of the export price, the level· of exports falls when factor costs in the export industries 
Increase. As these factor costs are likely to move with the general level of domestic prices, Pm 
serves as a proxy for them. Second, to the extent that resources Involved in exportable apple 
production can be transferred to other uses or that the export price can be kept different from 
the domestic price, the relative profttability of exporting apples falls with an Increase in domestic 
prices. 
5.2. MODEL FOR NZ APPLE TRADE 
Apples are considered to come in two types: NZ-type apples featuring the varietal mix available 
in NZ, and Australian-type apples featuring the varietal.mix available in Australia. The current 
world market for NZ-type apples Is represented by panels (a) and (b) of Figure 5.1. The 
Australian market is represented by panel (c) of Figure 5.1. 
8m and Dm represent the supply and demand curves for NZ apples respectively in Figure 
5.1. (a). Figure 5.1. (b) and (c) represent the total world market for apples facing NZ separated 
into the Australian market (c) and the 'all other countries' market (b). 
fhe demand for NZ-type apples outside NZ is represented by the excess demand curves, 
EDIl1l' the rest of the world (except Australia) and EDA Australia. It may be noted that the excess 
demand curves are actually demand curves because the product, NZ-type apples, is considered 
Price 
NZ Market 
(a) 
Model for NZ apple trade 
with Australian Import ban 
World Market 
Price 
(b) 
o Quantity 0 -Qy Quantity 
Figure 5.1. Model for New Zealand apple trade. 
unique to NZ in this model. 
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Australia Market 
Price 
(c) 
o Quantity 
In the current policy environment, the excess demand curve for NZ-type apples in Australia 
(EDA) is zero in Figure S.l.(c), given the import ban due to Fire Blight. In the absence of 
International transactions costs, the export price of NZ-type apples and the NZ domestic price 
PNZ will be equal where NZ excess supply ESm equals the excess demand for NZ-type apples for 
the rest of the world (EDRw) (Figure S.l.(b». 
At that price the quantity of apples supplied in NZ is Q8 and the quantity demand QA. NZ 
exports to the rest of the world are Q, (equal to Q8 - QA). NZ exports to Australia are zero 
(Figure S.l.(c». DTA represents the total demand function for apples in Australia, it includes 
NZ-type apples and Australian-type apples. 
In the Australian market (Figure S.l.(c» the quantities supplied and demanded is QL and 
the price of Australian-type apples is PAZ, given the unavailability of NZ-type apples. If the 
import ban on NZ type apples into Australia is lifted, the price of NZ-type apples, PAl , in 
Australia is reduced. 
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When the increase in export demand facing NZ from Australia is added to the excess 
demand of the rest of the world, EDRwf the total excess demand facing NZ is increased to EDT-
The NZ export price is increased to PNZ I and the price of NZ-type apples in Australia is reduced 
to PA". If the import ban adjustment is less than complete PAl will remain higher than PNZ with 
the dift'erence being the tarift' equivalent of the import protection remaining. 
The reduction in PAl will move the demand curve for their substitutes (Australian-type 
apples) and to the left, Figure 5.1.(c). The quantity demanded and supplied of Australian-type 
apples will decrease to Qm and the price of Australian-type apples will fall to PAZ'. 
S.2.1. Assumptions 
The assumptions in this model are: 
(i) NZ-type apples are distinguished as an imperfect substitute for Australian-type apples. 
(ii) NZ is the only producer country for NZ-type apples. 
(iii) The supply of NZ fresh apples is a function of PNZ, and the cost of the requirements for 
controlling Fire Blight disease for Australian market <X.. In the Australian case SA is a 
function of P A" and the control cost of the disease in the case that it will be established y. 
(Iv) In the long run, NZ may expand the area devoted to apples or expand cultivated area. 
Any change in the price requires sufttcient time for adjusting the supply level. 
(v) The introduction of a phytosanitary barrier is represented as a shift in exogenous variables. 
The levels of these variables in this model represent policy alternatives for control of Fire 
Blight disease in Australia. 
5.3. MODEL EQUATIONS 
The algebraic version of the model outlined in figure 5.1. is given by the following set of 
equations (1 - 8). 
The parameters (X and y represent the control cost of Fire Blight disease in NZ and 
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Australia respectively. And, lCrepresents the non tariff barrier (ad valorem equivalent) in the 
Australian market, which affects directly the price of NZ-type apples in Australia. 
The general model formulates the Fire Blight problem in NZ-type apples functions as: 
DTA :& 
"'m" < 0 = DTA, (PA ) (1) 
sl :& :& "'Sl > 0, ... < 0 = SA (PAt Y ) • ,
" y (2) 
p! = pl (P~) "'cr: > 0 (3) 
pi I I 
"'nNZ > 0,... > 0 = PA (PNZ , It) • A ,
" It (4) 
S~ I "'Sl > 0, .... < 0 = SNZ ( PNZ' CI ) • , (5) liZ 
DI I 
"'DI < 0 = DNZ (PNZ ) . HZ , (6) NZ 
1 I 
"'BDI < 0 EDlbv = ED. ( P NZ ) • , (7) ... 
S~ I T:& I = DHZ + ( D A - SA) + ED. (8) 
Where: 
1 and 2 
= NZ and Australian-type apples respectively. 
Own price elasticity of the Australian total demand for apples 
Own price supply elasticity of the Australian-type apples 
Supply elasticity of own price New Zealand-type apples 
Elasticity of the NZ control cost of the disease of the NZ-type apples supply 
Demand elasticity of own price of the NZ-type apples 
~:. = - ( :: ) x (;~) 
Elasticity of the control cost of the disease with respect to the supply of 
Australian-type apples 
Cross price elasticity of the Australian demand for apples 
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Price transmission elasticity of the Australian price apples and the price of NZ-
type apples 
Elasticity of the ad valorem NTH on the Australian price of NZ-type apples 
Elasticity of the NZ-type apple excess demand of the rest of the world 
The total demand function for apples in Australia DTA (equation 1) includes NZ-type apples 
and Australian-type apples. The price P / is used as a proxy for the weighted average price of 
NZ-type apples and Australian type apples. The demand of apples is expected to be negative 
related with the price. From equation (1): 
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(9) 
Dividing by DTA, then, we obtain the proportionate change In the left-hand side (LHS) variable, 
which is represented by the hat ("): 
(10) 
Expanding by multiplying by PA,2IP/, then: 
.. _ (aDTA ) (P!) (tIP.!) DT-- x--x--
A ~D2 DT p2 QrA A A 
(11) 
Replacing with elasticities and variables hat: 
(12) 
The Australian supply of fresh apples is modeled as a function of pA,2, and gamma (y), 
which represents the control cost of Fire Blight in Australia, equation 2. 
Differentiating equation (2): 
( 2) ( as2 ) 2 asA 2 A tlSA = aP.: X tlPA - ay x dy 
(13) 
Dividing by SA then, we obtain the proportionate change in the left-hand side (LHS) 
variable, which Is represented by the hat ("): 
(14) 
Expand by multiplying the first term by P AlP M and the second one by gamma/gamma. 
Then: 
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(15) 
Replacing with elasticities and variables hat: 
A2 A 
"A = 'IlS!)( rA, - 'Ily)( t (16) 
That is the percentage change in the Australian apple supply is given by the algebraic sum 
of the percentage change in the explanatory variables, weighted by this respective elasticities. 
Similiarly equations (3) to (7) are transformed so that the model in rate of change form is 
by equations (17) to equation (21): 
1'1 
A = ( 'Ilcp .. )( I! ) (17) 
11 
A = ( 'Iln .. x INZ ) + ( 'IlII: )( t ) (18) 
'NZ = ('Ils )( INZ ) - ('Il.)( a ) (19) NZ 
iJNZ = - ( 'IlDNI )( 1HZ ) (20) 
JIb! = - (I)BD1 )( 1HZ ) 
.Rw .. (21) 
The price of Australian-type apples in Australia is a function of the price of NZ-type apples 
in Australia (P /). This price PAl is a function of the price of NZ apples and a exogenous variable 
kappa (lC), which represent the ad valorem equivalent non taritT barrier in Australia. 
The NZ demand of apples (equation 6) Is expected to be negative related with the price. 
The NZ supply of fresh apples (equation 5) is modeled as a function of its own price PNZ and the 
control cost of the Australian requirements regarding Fire Blight disease, which is represented 
by alpha (a.). It is expected to be positively related to the price and negatively related to the cost 
of Fire Blight control (a.). As noted by the sign above the explanatory variables. 
The percentage change in the NZ apple supply is given by the algebraic sum of the 
percentage change in the explanatory variables, weighted by these respective elasticities. 
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Differentiating totally equation (8): 
tIS!z = dDl.z + dDTA - tlSl + tlEDl, (22) 
1 Z 1 1 tlSNZ + tlSA = dDNZ + tlDTA, + dBD. (23) 
Dividing by (SNZ + S,J and (DNZ + DTA + EDR,): 
(24) 
Then, replacing for variables hat (Ii): 
w1xA!z + w:zxA! = W3xD'TA, + w"x6!z +W5xBl>~ (25) 
Where: 
That is the percentage change in the Australian and NZ apple supply is given by the algebraic 
sum of the percentage change in the total demand of Australia New Zealand and the excess 
. demand from the rest of the world, weighted by these respective proportions in the total. 
5.4. DATA SPECIFICATION 
5.4.1. Parameters 
The parameters for the model were obtained from past studies. Parameters are available relating 
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to the Australian and NZ domestic apple markets in Hinchy (1990) and Hinchy (1991), who 
reported the following estimates: 'I1sA2 = 0.3, 'I1SNZl = 0.3 and 1loml = -0.3. 
Since the analysis concentrates on the effects of apple trade between Australia and NZ, 
some additional parameters are needed for forecasting excess demand and supply and therefore 
potential exports ifthe ban is reduced. Stern (1976), stated that the "long-run" excess demand 
elasticity has a median of -0.78. Therefore, this value (-0.78) will be used in the model as price 
elasticity of excess demand of NZ apples facing for the rest of the world 'I1BDRw 1. The elasticity 
of Australian demand for imports with respect to relative price of fruit in general has been 
estimated as -0.73 (Stern, 1976:349). The cross price elasticity of demand for Australian-type 
apples with respect to the price of NZ-type apples was taken to be 0.5. The price transmission 
elasticity between PNZ and PAl, ('I1p) was taken as one (1). 
Table 5.1. Summary of the Parameters (Price elasticities) used in the equations model: 
I Parameters I Estimated Value I Source I 
'I1sNZ 0.3 Hinchy, 1990 
'I1DNZ -0.3 Hinchy, 1990 
2 
'I1SA 0.3 Hinchy, 1990 
'I1DTA -0.9 Assumption 
'I1BDRw -0.78 Stern, 1976 
'I1cp 12 0.5 Assumption 
'I1PTI-2 1 Assumption 
The "Homogeneity condition" in demand theory (Philips, 1983) states that the algebraic 
sum of all price elasticities for a product and its income elasticity of demand should be zero. The 
income elasticity of demand for apples in Australia is likely to be positive. Let us assume it has 
a value of 0.4, accordingly the cross price elasticity between NZ-type and Australian-type apples 
is high, say 0.5, then the Australian demand elasticity ought to be of the order of 0.9. 
The cost of Fire Blight control is assumed to affect production in the opposite direction 
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from the product price but to the same degree. Accordly, the supply elasticity of the cost of Fire 
Blight control in NZ ('11u ) and Australia ('11y) are both assumed to be -0.3. The price transmission 
elasticity of the Australian price of NZ-type apples and NZ price apples is taken as one because 
the barrier is expressed In ad valorem tariff equivalents. 
5.4.l. Model Solution 
In matrix form equations (12), (16) to (21) and (25) may be summarised as in equation (26). 
If equation (26) is pre-multiplied by the inverse of the parameter matrix then we get equation 
(27). 
(27) 
The endogenous variables are: JNZ , iJNZ , J1, D'TA , 11, 1~, Eb~, 1NZ 
The parameters are 11.wi, 110m I, 'lsi,1lorA' 1bw.r .. ',1lc/2 and 'YlnANZ. The exogenous variables are 
a, y, K. Equation (27) in expanded form is given as equation (28) 
D'TA 1 0 
'1M" 0 0 0 0 0 
-I 
JZ 0 0 1 
-'Is" 0 0 0 0 0 A 
-'I, x , 
,2 
0 0 1 21 0 0 -0 0 A -'Iep 0 
,I 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -'I~ -'1& x t: A 
= 
r X 
9NZ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -'IS
n 
11. x a (28) 
iJNZ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 l1Dn 0 
Bbl 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 .. l1BD .. 0 
'NZ -oA7 OA7 0 0 0.53 -0.27 -0.26 0 
Putting the numerical values into this matrix, we solved for the endogenous variables. In 
numerical form equation (28) becomes equation (29): 
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D'rJ. 
,3 1 0 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 J. 
I! 0 1 -0.3 0 0 0 0 0 -0.3 x t 0 0 1 -0.5 0 0 0 0 0 
,1 J. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1 -0.3 xi 
-
x (29) 
'lIZ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -0.3 1 x 4 
iJ. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8.7. 0 
Rbi 
... -oA7 OA7 0 0 0.53 -0.27 -0.26 0 0 
'NZ 
The Inverse matrix in equation (26) was obtained using Lotus 1·2·3 V. 2.01 spreadsheet package, 
at PC Network Lincoln University 650 Mb disk, 7 Mb memory. This inverse is given in 
Appendix 7. 
5.5. ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF A REDUCTION IN IMPORT PROTECTION 
The model developed in the previous section is used to evaluate the impact of modifying the apple 
Import ban Into Australia. 
5.5.1. Current situation 
The current values of the endogenous variables in the Australian and NZ markets is shown in 
Table 5.2. This situation was taken as the· base model scenario. The excess demand of Australia 
(ED At> in the current situation is zero. (See Section 5.1.). 
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Table 5.2. Current ~ituation· in Australian and NZ apples markets. 
Endogenous Current Situation 
Variables Xo 
~Zl 410 000 tonnes 
DNzl 206 000 tonnes 
SAZ 363 000 tonnes 
D Z A 363 000 tonnes 
PAZ NZ $ 881.00 (.) 
EDAl 0 
EDIt"l 204 000 tonnes 
PNZl NZ $ 410.00 
Source: (OECD, 1991). (.) Exchange rate = AlNZ $ 0.77 
5.5.2. Alternative Policies 
Four alternative policies that the Australian Government could choose if it decided to reduce 
NTB against NZ apples are considered. These policies were represented in the model with 
changes in K', a and 'Y (See section 5.1.2.). 
The model to be used in the evaluation is in rate of change form. The differentials used 
to construct the model are subject to "ceteris paribus" conditions so that the model can only be 
legitimately used for small changes in the exogenous variables. In these simulations, the 
exogenous variable (lC) that represents the NTB's ad valorem equivalent was decreased by ten per 
cent. 
1. In the rlrst alternative policy (Policy 1) Australia reduces the ban on NZ apples (lC = -0.1), 
without putting a restriction on NZ apples exports (a = 0) and no control cost for Australia 
("( = 0). 
1. The second alternative policy involves some of the requirements that Australia has 
suggested be imposed on NZ-type apples in order to minimize the risk and uncertainty of 
infection in its crops (See section 4.1.3.). The cost of Fire Blight prevention is assumed to 
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be paid by NZ. Australia· does not assuine any cost so that with the initial assumption to 
reduce the ban lC = -0.1 then a = 0.1 and y = o. 
3. The third alternative policy involves reducing the import ban on NZ-type apples In 
Australia and Australia assumes the risk of control cost If the disease aWeets Its own 
producers. Australia does not impose requirements to NZ apples. That Is, a = 0 and now 
y = 0.1 and lC = -0.1. 
4. The fourth policy consists of a change In all the exogenous variables. As Australia reduces 
the ban (lC = -0.1), it is assumed to simultaneously impose some requirements on NZ apples 
(a = 0.1) and it assumes part of the risk of the disease (y = 0.1). 
5.5.3. Cost Benefit Analysis 
Cost-benefit analysis Is used to evaluate the welfare effects of the alternative policies. This 
analysis Includes estimates of the level and the distribution of economic costs and benefits from 
the reduction of the phytosanitary restriction. 
Consumer surplus (CS) is a measure of changes in consumer welfare with respect to the 
data base line under a particular policy decision. The welfare of consumers is determined by both 
the quantity and the price of goods that they are able to consume. The change in the net benefit 
in New Zealand <NBm> is the difference between the changes in producer surplus (PSNJ and the 
consumer surplus (CSNZ). The net benefit in Australia (NBA) includes the rent to ihe non tariff 
barrier. It represented the difference between the import price and the Australian price of NZ-
type apples. This rent is apart of the distorting effect of the phytosanitary barrier in the 
Australian market. 
The following formulae were used to compare the changes in the surpluses: 
Il PSNZ = Il P. Ql + 1/2 ( Il Q. Il P) 
Il CSNZ = CSNZ1 - CSNZo 
Il NBNZ = Il CSNZ + Il PSNZ 
Il CSA = CS/ - CS/ 
Where: 
11 PSA =11 P. Ql +112 ( 11 Q. 11 P) 
rNTB = ( PAl - PNZ' ) X EDA 
11 NBA = 11 CSA + rNTB + 11 PSA 
11 P = change In price between the base line and the policy simulation 
11 P = PI - Po 
11 Q = change in quantities between the base line and the policy simulation 
11 Q = Ql - Q 0 
PI = new price result from the policy simulation 
Po = initial price (base line) 
PNZ' = price of NZ-type apples as result of the policy simulation 
PAl' = price of Australian-type apples as result of the policy simulation 
Ql = new quantity of fresh apples result from the policy simulation 
Qo = initial quantity of fresh apples (base line) 
ED A = Australian apples imports from NZ 
rNTB = rent to the non tariff barrier 
CSNZ = consumer surplus in NZ 
PSNZ = producer surplus in NZ 
NBNZ = net benefit in NZ 
CSA = Australian consumer surplus of apples 
PS A = Australian producer surplus 
NB A = Australian net benefit 
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5..6.RUULTS 
5.6.l. Alternative policy one 
A summary of the etTects of the reduction of the ban in 10 per cent (Policy one) on the 
endogenous variables Is presented as Table 5.1. The price of NZ-type apples in NZ increased 
while the price of apples in Australia (P A 2) decreased. The percentage changes were higher In 
the prices than in the quantities because the elasticities are less than one in absolute value (Figure 
5.2). The rise in the price of NZ-type apples (PNJ was NZ $15.90/tonne. Simultaneously P A2 
decreased NZ $26.97. 
Effects of policy one on the endogenous 
variables (Prices and Quantities) 
Percentage change 40/0 ................................................................................................................................................................. . 
-2% ........................ . 
-40/0························ ......................................................................................................................................... . 
P(NZ1) P(A2) S(NZ1) O(NZ1) S(A) OT(A) EO(Rw) 
~ Policy 1 
NZ1= NZ-type apples In NZ 
A 1 = NZ-type apples In Australia 
A2 = Australian-type apples in Australia 
Figure 5.2. EtTects of Policy 1 on the endogenous variables 
The supply of NZ-type apples (SNZl) increased 1.2 per cent with a new supply of 415 
thousand tonnes. The demand of NZ-type apples in NZ (DNz 1) decreased 1.2 per cent with a new 
quantity of 204 thousand tonnes. The supply of Australian-type apples SA decreased 0.9 per cent 
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Table 5.4. EfI'ects of the simulation Police one (1) 
5A.1. Results of Policy 1 on the endogenous variables 
ENOOG % NEW ABSOLUTE 
VAR. CHANGES SITUATION CHANGES 
Xl (Xo-Xl) 
SNZ 1.2 414769 4769 
ONZ -1.2 203604 2396 
Sl -0.9 359666 3334 
OA2 2.8 373001 10001 
PA2 -3.1 $ 854 -26.97 
EOAI 13335 133335 
EOa" -3.0 197830 -6170 
PNZ 3.9 $ 426 15.90 
5.4.1. Welfare effects of Policy 1 in NZ $(0008) 
POLICY 1 
CSNZ NZ $ -823 
CSA 7047 
rNTB 5709 
PSNZ 6556 
PSA2 -9655 
NBNZ 5733 
NBA 3101 
NBT 8834 
Where: 
S = supply 
o = demand 
P = price 
ED = excess demand 
CS = consumer surplus 
rNTB = rent to the non tariff barrier 
PS = producer surplus 
NB =- net benefit 
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with a new equilibrium point of 360 thousand tonnes of Australian-type apples supplied. The 
total demand in Australia (DTA) increased 2.8 per cent with a new total demand of 373 thousand 
tonnes of apples. Therefore, the excess demand (ED A 1) rised to 13.34 thousand tonnes, which will 
be import of NZ-type apples. The decrease in Australian protection increasing the Australian 
Import demand for NZ-type apples. Apples price goes up In NZ and down In Australia as a 
result. 
Australian imports of NZ-type apples 
alternative polices 
Tonnes (Thousands) 
20 20 ............................................................................................ ~----,. ............................................ . 
15.23 
15 ·····················1·3·:34·············· ..................................... . 
10 ... 
5··· 
o 
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 
Figure 5.3. Australian excess demand for NZ-type apples 
In Australia a rent to the-NTB (rNTB) was produced. This rent represents the difference 
between PAl and PNZ times the quantity of NZ-type apples imported. The rent was $5 709 
thousand dollars and it was lower than the consumer surplus in Australia (CSA) NZ$7 047 
thousand. 
Table 5.1.2. shows the welfare effects of policy one. The change in the producer surplus in 
NZ (P~Z> was positive NZ $6 556 thousand, and the change in the consumer surplus (CSNZ> was 
negative $823 thousand. The overall welfare change in NZ (NBNZ> was positive $5 733 thousand. 
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5..6.2. Alternative poUcy two 
The effects of the reduction of the ban and the imposition of requirements on NZ-type apples 
because of the disease (policy two) on the endogenous variables have a similar trend to the effect 
of policy one. 
Effects of alternative policies on the 
variables (Prices and Quantities) 
Percentage change 8% ................ . .............................. . 
-4% ................. . 
-8% ................. . 
P(NZ1) P(A2) S(NZ1) D(NZ1) SA DA DRw 
~ Policy 1 _ Policy 2 E888l Policy 3 _ Policy 4 
NZ1= NZ-type apples in NZ 
A1 = NZ.type apples in Australia 
A2 .. Australian-type apples in Australia 
Figure 5.4. Effect of the alternative policies on the endogenous variables 
The price of NZ type apples increased 6.1 per cent, with a new price of $410. This new 
price of Pm was higher than the price obtained as a result of policy one because the costs of the 
requirements were paid by NZ. The prices of apples in Australia (P A2) decreased 2 per cent and 
the new price of Australian apples was $864. 
8ml decreased 1.2 per cent and the DNZl decreased 1.8 per cent. Sl decreased in 0.6 per cent 
and DT A increased in 1.8 per cent with respect to the base line. 
The excess demand for apples in Australia increased to 8.6 thousand tonnes with this 
policy. The rises in EDAl with Policy 2 were smaller than the rises with policy one. The import 
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Table 5.5. Effects of the simulation of Polley two (2) 
5.5.1. Results of Policy 2 on the endogenous variables 
ENDOG % NEW ABSOLUTE 
VAR. CHANGES SITUATION CHANGES 
Xl 
Sm -1.2 405163 -4837 
Dm -1.8 202251 -3749 
Sl -0.6 360 859 -2141 
DA2 1.8 369424 6424 
PA2 -2.0 $ 864 -17.32 
EDAl 8.6 8.6 
EDaw -4.7 194346 9653 
Pm 6.1 $ 435 24.88 
5.5.2. Welfare effects of Policy 2 NZ $(0008) 
POLICY 2 
CSNZ NZ$ -I 288 
CSA 4496 
rNTB 3674 
PSm 1001 
PSA2 -6233 
NBNZ 8731 
NBA 1936 
NBT 10667 
Where: 
S = supply 
D = demand 
P = price 
ED = excess demand 
CS = consumer surplus 
rNTB = rent to the non tariff barrier 
PS = producer surplus 
NB = net benefit 
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of NZ-type apples in Australia is 8.6 thousand tonnes. The reduction in imports with respect to 
pollcy one Is explained by the rise in the cost of requirements for NZ. The percentage change 
In the NZ apple price Increased with respect to policy one when the cost of the requirements 
Increased in 10 per cent. The absolute change of the price of NZ apples PNZ is $ 10 dollars /tonne 
higher than the price estimated for policy one. 
The change In producer surplus in NZ (PSNZ) was positive $1 001 thousand dollars, and the 
change In consumer surplus In NZ (CSNZ) was negative $ 1 288 thousand dollars. The change In 
net benetlt in NZ (NHta> was positive $ 8731 thousand dolll:lrs. In Australia CSA was lower than 
pollcy one $4 496 thousand dollars, because of the rise in the price of NZ-type apples and the 
reduction in the imports. The rent to the NTH (rNTB) was positive and lower than policy one. 
The rNTB was almost as high as the change in the consumer surplus in Australia (CSA). With 
polley two, the r NTH was lower than policy one, because the excess· demand of Australia 
decreased and the quantity of NZ-type apples imported decreased from 13.3 thousand tonnes in 
pollcy one to 8.6 thousand tonnes in policy two. The total change in net benetlt for Australia was 
positive $1 936 thousand dollars. 
5.6.3. Alternative polley three 
Policy three involved the reduction of the ban and the risk of control cost of the disease only 
from Australia. PNZ increased to NZ $434 and PAZ decreased from $881 to $863 dollars/tonne. 
Sm1 Increased with a new supply of 417 thousandtonnes and the DNzldecreased to 202 thousand 
tonnes. The import of NZ-type apples to Australia (EDA) was 20 thousand tonnes. SAz decreased 
3.6 per cent 350 thousand tonnes supplied from Australia and D A Z increased 1.9 per cent with a 
new quantity demanded of 370 thousand tonnes. 
The change In total demand from Australia is higher than the change in total demand in 
pollcy two. Nevertheless, the supply of Australia had ditTerent etTect: with policy two supply 
increases and with policy three it decreased. The reason was the cost of the diseases. 
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Table 5.6. Effects of the simulation of Polley three (3) 
5.6.1. Results of Policy 3 on the endogenous variables 
ENDOG % NEW ABSOLUTE 
VAR. CHANGES SITUATION CHANGES 
Xl 
SNZ 1.7 417154 7153 
DNZ -1.7 202406 -3594 
SA2 -3.6 349832 13168 
DA2 1.9 369834 6834 
PA2 -2.1 $ 863 -18.43 
EDAI 20 20 
EDRw -4.5 194745 9255 
PNZ 4.5 $ 434 23.85 
5.6.2. Welfare effects of Policy 3 in NZ $(0008) 
POLICY 3 
CSNZ NZ$ -1234 
CSA 4786 
rNTB 8576 
PSNZ 9862 
PSA2 -6326 
NBNZ 862 
NBA 7036 
NBT 15664 
Where: 
S = supply 
D = demand 
P = price 
ED = Excess demand 
CS = consume .. surplus 
rNTB = rent to the non tariff barrier 
PS = producer surplus 
NB = net benetit 
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The effect in producer surplus of NZ (PSNz) was positive with respect to the base line, 
$9862 thousand dollars, and the change In consumer surplus In NZ (CSNzl is negative $1 234 
thousand dollars. The change in the net benefit for NZ and Australia were positive ($8 628 and 
$7035 respectively). Australia CSA change was $4 786 thousands because of the imports from 
NZ. The rent to the NTB was $8 576 thousand NZ dollars. 
Rent to the NTB vs consumer surplus 
Australia 
Thousands NZ $ 
..................................................................................................... fv-...,........,,.......,( 
4· 
POlicy 1 
rNTB= rent to the non tariff barrier 
CSA = consumer surplus Australia 
Policy 2 Policy 3 
~ CSA2 ~ rNTB 
Policy 4 
Figure 5.5. Rent to the non tariff barrier vs consumer surplus in Australia 
5.6.4. Alternative policy four 
The etTects of the reduction of the ban and the increase of the control cost of Fire Blight for both 
countries sharing the costs (policy four) in the endogenous variables are presented in Table 5.4.1. 
The price of NZ-type apples in NZ (PNz) increased 8 per cent ($32.82 dollars/tonne) with a new 
price of $443/tonne. The PAZ decreased 1 per cent ($8.781tonne) with a new price of apples in 
Australia of $872. 
64 
Table 5.7. Effects of the simulation of Polley four (4) 
5.7.1. Results of Policy 4 on the endogenous variables 
ENDOG % NEW ABSOLUTE 
VAR. CHANGES SITUATION CHANGES 
Xl 
SNZ -0.6 407 547 -2453 
DNZ -2.4 201052 -4948 
SAZ -3.3 351024 -11 976 
DAz 0.9 366 258 3258 
PAZ -1.0 $ 872 -8.78 
EDAI 15.2 15.2 
EDR'tt' -6.2 191261 -12739 
PNZ 6.1 $ 443 32.82 
5.7.2. Welfare effects in NZ $(000s) 
POLICY 4 
CSNZ NZ$ -1699 
CSA 2266 
rNTB 6541 
PSNZ 13337 
PSAZ -3136 
NBNz 11638 
NBA 5671 
NBT 17309 
Where: 
S = supply 
D = demand 
P = price 
ED = Excess demand 
CS = consumer surplus 
rNTB = rent to the non tariff barrier 
PS = producer surplus 
NB = net benefit 
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The Sm1 and the DNZ1 decreased 0.6 per cent and 2.4 per cent respectively. The quantities 
of Australian-type apples supplied decreased because its price decreased with respect to the base 
line. There was a rise in the cost of production in both countries. ED A I was 15.2 thousand tonnes. 
The rNTB was $ 6 541 thousand NZ dollars. SA 2 decreased 3.3 per cent (12 thousand tonnes) and 
D A 2 ,increased 0.9 per cent. In NZ the change in PSNZ was positive, and the change in NZ CSNZ 
was negative. 
5.6.5. General Analysis 
All the alternative policies produced a fall in the price of NZ-type apples in Australia as well in 
the price of Australian type apples. When the effect of the cost of Fire Blight disease was 
evaluated, the change in the price of NZ and Australian-type apples was highest in policy two, 
but the difference in absolute values was only $1 dollar in the price in Australian-type apples and 
the price of NZ-type apples between policy two and policy three. The excess demand of NZ-type 
apples in Australia (EDA) varied between 20 thousand tonnes (policy three) and 8.5 thousand 
tonnes (policy two). 
The smallest change in the price of NZ-type apples in Australia (P A 2) was in policy four and 
the high change was the result of policy one. In all the alternative policies simulated, the supply 
of Australian-type apples decreased and the total demand of apples in Australia was projected 
to increased. The greatest change of supply of Australian-type apples was in policy three, and the 
greatest change of total demand of apples in Australia was the result of policy one. The smallest 
relative change of Australian supply was the effect of policy two. The change in the price of 
Australian-type apples PA2 was slightly lower in policy four. The largest change in PA2 was in 
policy one. The pA2 decreased with all the alternative policies, it was because the reduction in 
the ban. The control cost of the disease affects the supply of the Australian-type apples. 
In Australia, as an importing country the relaxation of NTB'son the apple trade was 
positive for total consumer surplus in all the policies. However, the consumer surplus of NZ-type 
· Changes in Economic Welfare 
Alternative policies 
Australia 
Poley 1 
.................. 
Poley 2 
_. r~ •••• ~+~ .. ·~ ....~ ....~wl!WmmJ 
Polcy4 
·10 o 6 
Thousands NZ $ 
_ CSA ~ PSA EE8I rNTB 
CS = consumer surplus 
PS = producer surplus 
rNTB = rent to the non tariff barrier 
NB = net benefit 
Polley 1 
PoUcy2 
PoDcy3 
Policy 4 
10 
New Zealand 
~~~ ............................... .. 
o 6 
Thousands NZ $ 
10 
_ CSNZ ~ PSNZ ~ NB 
Figure 5.6. Evaluation of the economic welfare effect of the alternative policies 
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apples in Australia CSA1 depends on the amount of apple trade. The consumer surplus of 
Australian-type apples CSAZ was highest with policy three because the importation from NZ 
Increases. The price of the Australian-type apples PAZ decreased with all the alternative policies. 
The quantities of DA Z increased and SA Z decreased in all the alternative policies. With policy two, 
when was simulated that Australia imposed requirements over NZ apples the rent to the NTB 
decreased because the import of NZ-type apples decreased. 
In NZ the welfare trend was similar for all the alternative polices. The change in C~z was 
negative in all the simulations. CSNZ decreases but, it was compensated by the rise in PSNZ which 
was around three times greater. Any policy to reduce the ban is expected to benetit the NZ 
producer surplus (PSNJ and increase the net benetit in NZ. Policy four produced highest net 
benetit in NZ. The highest NB for NZ and Australia were the result of policy four and policy 
three respectively. When policy four was simulated, the P A;' and PNZ increased because both 
countries shared costs. 
Overall welfare effects 
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Figure 5.7. Total welfare effect on Australia and New Zealand 
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The change in the consumer surplus in NZ is negative when it was simulated any policy, 
but it is compensated with the positive change in the producer surplus which is almost four fold 
higher. Therefore, in NZ, the changes in total economic welfare are positive for any policy. The 
highest Net benefit in NZ was produced as a result of policy four ($11 638). 
The Australian producer surplus was negative but the total consumer surplus in Australia 
for NZ-type apples and Australian-type apples is positive. A rent to the non tariff barrier was 
established once NZ apple imports were permitted •. The greater net benefit in Australia was the 
result of policy 3 ($7 036) but in that situation the rent to the NTB was higher than the total net 
benefit ($8 576). 
It can be validly postulated that the best alternative policy for both countries if we only 
take into account consumer and producer surplus is the reduction of the ad valorem non tariff 
harrier with the share of the cost of Fire Blight disease (policy four). 
CIIAPI'ER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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This chapter contains three parts. The ftrst part discusses the results of this study. The second 
one draws the conclusions of the research, the aim of this research being to analyse the change 
in economic welfare arising from a reduction in the Australian phytosanitary barrier. The last 
part presents some recommendations for future research in this topic. 
6.1. DISCUSSION 
The New Zealand apple trade has been subjected to phytosanitary regulations by many importer 
countries. Sanitary controls are severe, particularly those related to the prevention of the 
introduction and spread of plant diseases. Fire Blight disease is a major phytosanitary barrier 
which restricts the apple trade between Australia and NZ. 
Not much work has been done in the area of economic evaluation of the reduction of 
phytosanitary barriers. Nevertheless, it has been analyzed using the concept ofbio-economic risk 
assessment. This analysis was carried out as part of decision making on quarantine matters in 
Australia. There are biological and economic uncertainties related to the prediction and to the 
spread and establishment of the disease and consequent production losses. These approaches deal 
with high values of risk, uncertainty and technical constraints. This kind of analysis was 
undertaken for the importer country. 
The potential benefit to Australia if the ban is reduced will be represented by a greater 
variety of apples available at a lower price level for consumers. On the other hand, the cost of 
free trade is the increased risk of the disease becoming established in Australia, with the 
consequent impact on Australian producers competitiveness. The importation of apples to 
Australia will place pressure on growers to· restructure orchards and improve their emciency. 
This phytosanitary barrier has bred inefficiency in the Australian apple industry, because 
they protect producers that have high unit costs when compared to world standards. Then, this 
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barrier produces an ineft1ciency in the allocation of resources. 
In the short run this ban protects the Australian domestic market from external 
competition. Also, the apple industry gains stability in the market, the domestic relative price 
Increases and there Is no incentive to acquire knowledge about the Fire Blight that still has not 
arrived in Australia. In the long-run this ban may allow the internal market to prepare itself 
for the competition. 
The possibility of Fire Blight entering Australia is high in the long-run. One efficient 
course of action is to be ready to detect and control the disease if it appears in Australia. This 
Is possible through the Implementation of new research programmes that win enable them to 
develop the most appropriate method for·managing this disease. Both exporter and importer 
countries may benetit from such an exchange and the development of new technology. The cost 
of prevention with the desire of maintaining the level of infection at zero is very large. 
Despite this technical difficulty Australia and NZ have been looking for a way to cut 
down this barrier without causing negative impact upon their economies. This case under 
examination illustrates a change that provides an opportunity for the development of a true 
regional free-trade zone, creating a large and growing market. 
6.2. CONCLUSIONS 
This research was an analysis of the effects on economic welfare of a reduction in the Australian 
phytosanitary barrier. A partial equilibrium model with eight simultaneous equations under four 
alternative policies was developed as a means of determining the effects of the reduction of this 
barrier. This case was studied by modelling domestic and trade markets in both countries. The 
information obtained about the domestic supply and demand curves of both countries, was used 
to construct excess supply and excess demand curves. 
The role of the government was included in this partial m(] del as an exogenous variable. 
The ditTerent combinations of the exogenous variables a (NZ control cost of the disease), y 
(Australian control cost of the disease) and IC (Ad valorem equivalent non tariff barrier) gives us 
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the four alternative policies to evaluate the welfare economic effect if the ban is reduced. 
Nevertheless, the estimation of the gains and losses that arise in the context of this partial 
equilibrium model are restricted to small changes in the exogenous variables and we maintain 
the "ceteris paribus" condition. 
To analyse the effects of this deregulation, account has been taken of the changes in the 
endogenous variables: PNU PAZ, SNZ' DNz, SAZ, DAT, due to changes in the exogenous variables a, 
'Y and 1C. Also, the changes in economic welfare, consumer and producer surpluses have been 
examined. 
Comparison between the current situation of no trade between NZ and AustraUa and a 
relaxation of this regulation was attempted. The effect of the reduction of 1C, an ad valorem 
equivalent of the phytosanitary restriction, was simulated. In order to reduce the bias due to 
data limitations, the demand elasticity of all apples in Australia was assumed to be -0.9. In this 
partial equilibrium model of the trade between the two countries there are three exogenous 
variables: a, 'Y and 1C. If the effect of the import ban is reduced it could be under one of these 
four alternative policies: 
1. A reduction on the phytosanitary restrictions on NZ apples. The cost of NZ requirements 
and the Australian cost of controlling the disease are zero. (a= 0 and 'Y =0). 
2. Australia regulates NZ-type apples through a phytosanitary barrier including 
requirements which increase the cost of NZ export apples, represented by a (See Chapter 
4) (a = 0.1 and 'Y = 0). 
3. Risk and uncertainty of control of the disease are borne by Australia (a = 0 and 'Y = 0.1) 
. 4. Control costs are shared by Australia and NZ (a = 0.1 and 'Y = 0.1) 
The simulated effect on the base line increased Australian excess demand for NZ-type 
apples resulting from the drop of the price when the restriction was reduced. Australian ED A 1 
increases and the price of apples P A decreases in Australia, when the ad valorem equivalent non 
tariff barrier decreases the price of NZ apples increases. 
This welfare analysis shows that reducing the NTBs on NZ apples does not have the same 
effect In the NZ and Australian markets. In the Australian market there are three different 
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welfare effects: consumer surplus, producer surplus and rent to the non tariff barrier. The total 
Australian consumer surplus CSA includes the consumer surplus for NZ-type apples and 
consumer surplus for Australian-type apples. The CSA from Australian-type apples increases 
because of the fall of the price of Australian-type apples, the consumer surplus of NZ-type apples 
rises from zero and the total (CSA) is positive for all the policy choices. The overall result from 
the Import of NZ apples is a gain in the change in the consumer surplus in Australia. The gain 
in CSA from policy one is the highest. 
There is a rent to the non tariff barrier that does not contribute to the producer surplus 
in Australian PSA and neither is it captured by the consumers. However, it increases the benefit 
of the importers and· therefore the net benefit in Australia. The rent to the NTB is almost as 
high as the change in the consumer surplus in Australia (CSJ. In policies three and four this 
rNTB is higher than the CSA• In policies one and two the CSA is higher than the rent to the NTB. 
The main reason for this behaviour is the distorting protective effect on the Australian market 
of Its own NTBs. 
The losses in the change of producer surplus in Australia PSA are almost as high as the 
gain in Australian consumer surplus CSA from Australian and NZ-type apples. In policy 1 the 
losses In PSA are higher than in the other policies because the price of Australian-type apples is 
the lowest. The change in the producer surplus PSA and change in the net benefit in Australia 
NBA are positive. Australian producer losses could occur from disease control cost, but the 
strong reason seems to be the substitution effect (Australian-type vs. NZ-type apples). The NZ 
control cost of the disease has an inverse effect on the price of NZ apples. The alternative 
policies one and two produce the biggest reduction in PSA• But, the effect of policy three and 
policy four have less negative effect for PS A. This is due to the rise in P A and that in the policy 
four PNZ increases producing the reduction in the quantities of NZ-type apples in Australia. 
The economic welfare of NZ consumers CSNZ, decreases because the price PNZ rises, 
consequently NZ demand for apples falls. However, if we take into account the fact that 50 
percent of total NZ production is for export, the change in the amount of exports offsets the rise 
In PNZ and increases total welfare. The apples that were formerly consumed domestically, are 
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exported overseas and producers receive an increased producer surplus that offsets the NZ loss 
in consumer surplus. The PSNZ increases more than proportionally to the decrease of C~z. In 
every alternative policy-simulation combination the gains in the PSNZ offset the losses in CSm and 
therefore the NBNZ was positive for all cases. 
If the importing country increases the requirements for NZ (a), the DAI curve will shift 
up the demand curve and quantities traded will decrease (policy 2). Changes in the requirements 
raises the price of NZ apples, for instance, causing the NZ supply curve to shift to the left. PAl 
will decrease and the PNZ will increase. In this case if y = 0, then aU the cost involved in 
controlling the disease is borne by NZ. If there are some requirements from Australia associated 
with the access of NZ-type apples (a) and they want to assume some risk, then the cost of control 
Fire Blight (y) increases. The effect between both is inverse, ie. (while a J, , y i). With the 
application of the phytosanitary regulation, when a (the cost of NZ control of Fire Blight) 
Increases, the Internal cost of the producers in NZ increases. 
The price of apples in Australia changed as a result of allowing NZ access to the 
Australian apple market. Therefore, this leads to a new price for Australia and alters the partial 
equUlbrium model, with different prices and quantities for import. The PNZ apples increases and 
the consumption decreases, because of the substitution effect in all policies. The supply of NZ 
apples increases (policy one and policy three) because of the higher price of NZ-type apples and 
no cost of requirements for NZ. When the consequences of NZ cost of requirements (a) were 
evaluated (policy two and policy four), its influence on t~e supply of NZ-type apple was to reduce 
it directly. With respect to the Producer Surplus, PSNZ is positive and PSA is negative in all cases, 
because while NZ increases its production Australia decreases it. When the NZ cost of 
requirements for Fire Blight disease are zero, the supply of NZ apples increases (policy one and 
policy three). 
In these simulations Australia still maintains part of the NTB. Therefore, it produces a 
distortion in the welfare effects. The distorting effect of this banier in the Australian market 
is reflected in rNTB. The r NTB is positive in all the cases. 
It seems that the distorting effect of this ban in the economy is higher in Australia than 
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in NZ. Depending on the policy, the change in NBA could be better off in Australia. 
The high relative magnitude of the fall in PS A results from a substitution etTect and is not 
due to the Australian cost associated with the disease. With respect to the net benefit we can see 
that it is positive for Australia. The NB in NZ is also positive with all the alternative policies. 
This study is a ftrst approach which established a model to analyze the economic effects 
and interaction of reducing NTBs on the different markets of exporter and importer countries. 
The objective of the Fire Blight restrictions is a technical one, but the end result is a distortion 
and restriction of international trade. 
6.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research into the elasticities of supply and demand of apples in the Australian and New 
Zealand markets is required. The cost of Fire Blight control needs also to be investigated. 
Analyses of phytosanitary restrictions under game theory could prove to be particularly fruitful 
in order to evaluate a possible deal from negotiation. 
Future studies in NTBs could choose to analyze these barriers from an agricultural 
political economic perspective. The theoretical framework of quarantine restrictions could be 
analyzed using a number of economic concepts, such as public goods, externalities, government 
policy, risk-aversion, import competing industry, production function and technology in 
international trade. A number of perspectives can be taken on this problem: a trade perspective, 
a public policy perspective or a managerial economics perspective. The analysis of NTBs could 
be improved using sensitivity analyses. 
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DEFINITIONS 
MuiDDIDI permissible level (MPL): is set for each food that may contain a pesticide residue, 
according to the amount of that food consumed in daily nutrition. (Kagan, 1991). 
Pelt: any form of plant or animal life, or any pathogenic agent, Injurious or potentially 
Il\Iurlous to plants or plant products (The International Plant Protection Convention 
1991). 
Peltldde: a chemical which will klll some kind of Hvlng organism constituting a nuisance to 
the human (Guthrie, 1980:264). 
Quanmtine: Form of government regulatory intervention in a competitive market economy. 
In terms of economic efficiency, the only valid around recognised by economist for 
such intervention is If there is some type of market failure. Used as a synonym for the 
activity of reducing the disease content of imports (Public Good). (Hinchy, 1991:17) 
QllUlDtine pest: pest of potential national economic Importance to the country endangered 
thereby and not yet present there, or present but not widely distributed and being 
actively controlled (The International Plant Protection Convention 1991) 
.Risk: With respect to the impact of a disease, in a situation of risk there would be minimal 
disagreement among experts in assigning probabilities to the events in question 
(Hlnchy 1991:3) 
.Risk aversion: means that an Individual would be willing to pay more than the average value 
of a loss to insure against the risk of a loss (ABARE 1991:3) 
Tbe residue level: is what sets the tolerances for pesticides, as long as it does not exceed a 
certain portion that Average Daily Intake ADI. (Rhodes, 1990) 
'I1me path of a diaeaae: economic difference between eliminating a disease in the year in 
which It become established and the disease becoming endemic, affecting production 
Indefinitely Into the future (Hinchy, 1991:3) 
Tolerance: the permitted concentration of a pesticide chemical, its derivatives and adjuvants 
in or on a food. (Headley, 1970:92). 
ToDdty: the capacity of a substance to produce injury. (Graham, 1980). 
Uncertainty: With respect to the impact of a disease, in a situation of uncertainty there may 
be wide disagreement among experts in assigning probabilities and some may feel 
unable to assign them (Hinchy, 1991:3). 
Zero Tolerance for a pesticide means that no (detectable) amount of that pesticide chemical 
may remain on a specified food (Ekstrom, 1990). 
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APPENDIX! 
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES 
I. Quantitative restrictions and similar specific limitations 
1. Import Quotas 
2. Export limitations 
3. Licensing 
4. Voluntary export restraints 
5. Exchange and other financial controls 
6. Prohibitions 
7. Domestic content and mixing requirements 
8. Discriminatory bilateral agreements 
9. Counter trade 
D. Non taritT charges 
1. Variable levies 
2. Advance deposit requirement 
3. Antidumping duties 
4. Countervailing duties 
5. Border tax adjustments 
m. Government participation in trade and restrictive practices 
1. Subsidies and other aids 
2. Government procurement policies 
3. State trading, Government monopolies and exclusive franchises 
4. Government industrial policy and regional development measures 
5. Government financed research and development and other technology policies 
6. National sYstems of taxation and social insurance 
7. Macroeconomic polices 
8. Competition polices 
9. Foreign investment polices 
10. Foreign corruption polices 
11. Immigration polices 
IV. Customs procedures and administrative practices 
1. Customs valuation procedures 
2. Customs classification procedures 
3. Customs clearance procedures 
V. Technical barriers to trade 
1. Health and sanitary regulations and quality standards 
2. Safety and industrial standards and regulations 
3. Packaging and labelling regulations including trademarks 
4. Adverting and media regulations 
Source: Deardorft' (1985:13-14) 
APPENDIX 2 
APPLES WORLD MARKET 
2.1. Apples trade flows 1987 (Metric Ton) 
Exportation % Importation 
Argentina 233678 7.2 870 
Australia 44012 1.4 117 
Chile 275685 8.6 40 
France 772810 24.0 97404 
Germany West 44087 1.4 870403 
Italy 348949 10.8 65858 
Netherlands 192114 6.0 247558 
New Zealand 320920 10.0 2885 
United States 278234 8.6 133769 
Others 707467 22.0 1799052 
World 3217956 3217956 
Source: Satyanarayana 1989 
APPLES TRADE FLOWS 1987 
EXPORTATION 
NZ 
I~ 
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APPENDIX 3 
NEW ZEALAND APPLE MARKET 
3.1. New Zealand fresh fruit export. $'000 
Year Export $'000 
1987 282,854 
1988 283,745 
1989 303,445 
1990 402,593 
1991 480,432 
Source: New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board 1991 
3.2. New Zealand imports 1987 
Country Ton % 
Australia 304 11 
Canada 343 11 
United States 2238 78 
World 2885 100 
Source: Satyanarayana 1989 
3.3. Destinations of New Zealand exports of fresh pipfruit (in 000s Tny Cartons) 
1985 % 1986 % 19~7 % 1988 % 1989 % 
N.America 1571 19 1694 20 1903 21 1681 16 1731 18 
EC/Europe 5415 66 5908 67 6221 67 7728 75 6935 71 
Others 1153 14 1194 13 1079 12 948 9 1136 11 
Totals 8139 8796 9203 10357 9802 
Source: NZAPMB. Include pears but these only represent just over 1 % of export 
volumes. Others includes: Caribbean Pacitlc Islands, Middle East and SE Asia. 
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APPENDIX 4 
4.1 • New Zealand export volume tonnes fresh apple 1987-91 
1987 % 1988 1989 1990 % 1991 % 
% % 
Jan 62 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 
Feb 0 0 103 0 349 0 278 0 3013 1 
Mar 18059 11 21435 11 24501 14 40173 20 39907 20 
Apr 49199 29 56250 30 78220 44 67070 33 66007 32 
May 49424 29 58861 31 42771 24 53315 27 66123 32 
Jun 42856 26 49788 26 24082 14 32555 16 23165 12 
Jul 6905 4 3658 2 6045 3 6679 3 5556 3 
Aug 1062 1 278 0 1762 1 990 1 603 0 
Sep 106 0 291 0 40 0 111 0 20 0 
Oct 31 0 58 0 0 0 11 0 469 0 
Nov 1 0 24 0 1 0 1 0 5 0 
Dec 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tot 167712 190747 177771 201186 204869 
Source: New Zealand Department of Statistics. 
4.2. New Zealand export FOB Value ($000) fresh apples 1987-1991 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Jan 341 0 0 10 2 
Feb 0 156 446 434 4270 
Mar 13444 17551 21973 54851 58234 
Apr 36008 45779 69886 75431 94376 
May 36410 47789 37394 44952 99020 
Jun 31816 40473 21:570 29826 33630 
Jul 5118 3011 5442 6696 8373 
Aug 845 259 1617 896 638 
Sep 128 318 45 138 25 
Oct 37 56 0 13 586 
Nov 2 29 1 1 8 
Dec 9 1 0 1 0 
Tot 124558 155422 158374 213249 299162 
Source: New Zealand Department of Statistics. 
APPENDIX 5 
OTHER APPLES MARKETS 
5.1. European Community 
5.1.1. Apple'. produdion and trade in the EC 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Production 8260 7539 8767 7690 7572 
Area 316 316 316 316 304 
Tot cons. 8257 7519 8530 7844 7852 
Fresh 5055 5187 6650 5643 
Proces 3202 2332 1880 2201 
F. con pIc 15.7 16.0 20.5 17.3 
Imports 538 615 577 610 
% 1m From NZ 20.1 22.1 24.9 22.9 
Exports 187 197 174 150 
Source: OECD, 1991. 
5.1.2. Apple consumption in EC countries 
Country Kg per head year 
Holland 33.3 
U.K. 12.5 
Greece 24.7 
West Germany 24.3 
Belgium & Luxembourg 20.9 
Spain 20.3 
Italy 20.2 
Source: MAF Economic Division 1987 
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1992 1995 
7953 7979 
292 279 
8103 8200 
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APPENDIX 5.2. 
5.2. United States 
5.2.l. Important US apple produdng states ('000 toones) 
Region States 1988 1989 1990 %1990 
East New Y.,Pennsl., Oth. 1,337 1,350 1,077 24 
Central Michigan, Others 717 561 654 15 
West Wash. Calif., Oth. 2,822 2,243 2,789 62 
Total Total 4,876 4,154 4,520 100 
Source: USDA, MAFPolicy 1991. Year Ending June 
5.2.2. US apple production and trade. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1995 
Production 3565 4873 4142 4520 4401 4574 4835 
Area 179.2 183.2 188.0 194.4 194.0 201.0 212.0 
Tot Cons 3532 4690 3997 4294 4401 4350 4595 
Fresh 2003 2494 2255 2459 2394 2343 2469 
Process 1529 2196 1742 1835 1823 2007 2126 
F Con pIc 8.3 10.2 9.2 9.9 9.5 9.2 9.6 
Imports 140.7 119.2 116.3 106.5 
% Impo NZ 20.4 25.7 22.3 23.3 
Exports 173.8 301.6 261.0 333.3 
Source: OECD, 1991 
5.2.3. US apples trade ('000) 
Year ending in June 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Exports· 177 181 209 290 250 330 
Imports 124 132 133 123 116 106 
Oft' Season S. 622 471 533 719 701 680 
• Calendar Year. 
Source: USDA, MAFPolicy 1991. 
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5.3. Japan 
Apples production and trade in Japan. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 199Q 199~ 199~ 
Production 986 998 1042 1045 1050 1062 1080 
Area 48.6 49.3 49.6 49.8 55 55 55 
Tot. consum. 985 997 1041 1044 
Fresh 772 729 796 809 
Process 212 268 245 234 
F. con perle 6.4 6.0 6.5 6.6 
Imports 0 0 0 0 
Exports 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.4 
Source: OECD, 1991 
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APPENDIX 6 
AUSTRALIA APPLE MARKET 
6.1. Australian apples 1982-1990 
Period Production Q Export Price Domestic Price 
kt Fresh kt Exp $It kt Dom $It 
1982-83 301 33 518 166 520 
1983-84 267 16 622 186 693 
1984-85 352 29 632 189 769 
1985-86 288 26 590 172 946 
1986-87 328 38 767 150 756 
1987-88 304 22 781 159 1226 
1988-89 344 21 844 180 846 
1989-90 308 22 861 159 861 
SUM}: 2,492 207 5,615 1,361 6,617 
Aver 312 26 702 170 827 
Source: ABARE 
U Apple's production and trade Australia. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992- 1994-
Production 328 309 328 315 350 363 370 
Tot Cons 299 275 310 293 326 333 340 
Fresh 150 159 180 159 192 187 200 
Process 149 116 140 134 134 146 140 
Fr. conic 9.4 9.8 10.9 9.5 11.2 10.6 11 
Imports 0 0 0 0 0 
Exports 8.8 11.0 5.5 7.0 6.9 
Source: OECD, 1991. 
,-, 
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6.3. Production and Marketing of Australian Apples. Apples ('000 18 kg cartons or equivalent) 
Production Domestic Export Other 
1982 16,197 10,603 1,814 3,780 
1983 16,534 9,113 1,802 5,619 
1984 14,000 9,934 882 3,184 
1985 18,100 10,410 1,490 6,200 
Source: National Farmers' Federation 1986. 
6.4.EIcbange rate AustraHa end New Zealand 
Period Exchange Rate Exchange Rate 
US$/NZ US$lAus$ 
1982 0.752 1.017 
1983 0.669 0.902 
1984 0.577 0.879 
1985 0.497 0.667 
1986 0.522 0.671 
1987 0.591 0.700 
1988 0.655 0.782 
1989 0.598 0.791 
1990 0.596 0.781 
Source: Department of Statistics 
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APPENDIX 7 
MATRIX 
1.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 1.00 -0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.30 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.30 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.78 
-0.47 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.53 -0.27 -0.26 0.000 
Inverse matrix 
0.71 0.29 -0.55 -0.28 0.33 -0.17 -0.16 -0.62 
0.10 0.90 0.18 0.09 -0.11 0.06 -0.05 0.21 
0.32 -0.32 0.61 0.31 -0.36 0.18 0.18 0.69 
0.65 -0.65 -0.78 0.61 -0.73 0.37 0.36 1.38 
0.19 -0.19 -0.23 -0.12 0.78 0.11 0.11 0.41 
-0.19 0.19 0.23 0.12 0.22 0.89 -0.11 -0.41 
-0.50 0.50 0.60 0.30 0.57 -0.29 0.72 -1.07 
0.65 -0.65 -0.78 -0.39 -0.73 0.37 0.36 1.38 
Policy One (1) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Policy Three (3) 
0.00 
-0.03 
0.00 
-0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
APPENDIX 8 
ALTERNATIVE POUCIES 
Policy Two (2) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.10 
-0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Policy Four (4) 
0.00 
-0.03 
0.00 
-0.10 
-0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
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